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COMPLICATING OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM PAST INJUSTICE 
 
Tyler Chartrand 
 
 
 
This paper argues there are complicating factors when determining our obligations to redress 
past injustice. With reference to the debate between political theorists Jeremy Waldron and 
Janna Thompson, a more nuanced view on historical obligations is argued. This paper 
concludes that in some cases our historical obligations can be transformed or even superseded 
by present day conditions. 
 
The citizens of many modern nations must come to terms with some measure of historical 
injustice. In particular, nations formed by European colonialism have a legacy of genocide, 
cultural submission, and misappropriation of territory that continue to resonate. A very valuable, 
but straightforward, task is to use normative judgments to condemn as unjust these original 
instances of colonial intervention and their subsequent present-day resonances. A more difficult 
task is to determine what is to be done to address these injustices. While it may appear 
counterproductive to just ends, we cannot unconditionally accept all claims for reparation nor 
similar responses to historical injustice. We cannot allow guilt or anger to motivate decisions that 
are likely to produce their own far reaching resonances into the future. An obvious injustice is 
not the same as an obvious strategy of redress. I favour a ‘complicated’ view of our historical 
obligations that acknowledges that appropriate action is not always clear. In order to outline what 
I believe are the necessary complications, this paper responds to two essays that represent the 
prominent arguments on historical obligations.  
In his article “Superseding Historic Injustice,” Jeremy Waldron investigates the grounds 
upon which past injustices can be ‘superseded’ by present injustice and demonstrates how 
entitlements to reparation are not always legitimate. Waldron’s arguments receive a direct 
rebuttal from Janna Thompson in her article: “Historical Obligations.” Both articles use the 
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example of the Maori, a New Zealand aboriginal group, in order to extrapolate their respective 
arguments to other cases of aboriginal land claims. The two articles argue a very different case 
for obligations that arise from past injustice and it is my view that both, in dialogue, produce a 
more complicated idea of these obligations and past injustices. Waldron presents a series of 
strong arguments, some of which are quite vulnerable to the criticisms of Thompson. 
Nonetheless, Thompson can never fully refute Waldron’s case for complicating our historical 
obligations and, in some rare cases, denying those obligations.  
Before analyzing the arguments in full, it is important to outline what a view like 
Waldron’s is not doing. These arguments to deny historical obligations are not motivated by 
bigotry or a skewed view of justice. Rather, Waldron is concerned with present-day injustice and 
how this can at times “supersede” past injustice, which we can no longer correct. 1  He 
acknowledges the “moral significance” of the past and does not discount it when he makes his 
case.2 In complicating historical obligations, his language is not strong. Obligations may become 
“less credible,”3 or “must be responsive,”4 or are “vulnerable.”5 That these obligations can be 
superseded is merely “a possibility” that he does not believe “always happens.”6 The types of 
reparations he critiques are ones that “carry us in a direction contrary to…justice.”7 As his 
concern is with the present, he believes his arguments only apply “if an honest attempt is being 
made” to respond to a wronged group’s present conditions.8 He does not advocate complacency 
                                                
1 Jeremy Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” Ethics 103 (1992): 26. 
2 Ibid., 7. 
3 Ibid., 20. 
4 Ibid., 25. 
5 Ibid., 20. 
6 Ibid., 25. 
7 Ibid., 27. 
8 Ibid. 
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or inactivity vis-à-vis historical obligations. In fact, Thompson and Waldron both agree that 
historical obligations exist.9 The difference lies in how simple they think the obligations are.  
The first argument Waldron employs for ‘complicating’ historical obligations is against so-
called counterfactual approaches to calculating reparation. He opposes the view in favour of 
“full” recompense to “rectify past wrongs,” including transferring resources such as land.10 
Waldron objects to the suggestion that recompense can reverse past wrongs or erase their effects, 
counter to the facts. He maintains it would be difficult to determine what the natural course of 
events would be if an unjust event did not occur.11 He admits that one is certainly able to make 
predictions about what would have happened, but questions whether these predictions have the 
“moral authority” to determine appropriate reparations.12 Furthermore, the entire enterprise of 
predicting behaviour in hypothetical situations means “there is no fact of the matter” that can be 
derived by any method.13 Therefore, there can be no truth established on something that is 
counterfactual and this creates problems for those seeking to simplify calculation of reparations. 
But Waldron admits that a rational choice approach is quite common in other elements of 
justice and can be considered for this case. This approach ascribes rational choices—actions 
within self-interest, with respect to known preferences—to historical actors and counterfactually 
predicts how events would be altered.14 The implication for aboriginal land issues is that 
aboriginal groups historically were not able to act rationally, in their self-interest, for various 
reasons. This view suggests it would be more just if events today supposed those aboriginal 
                                                
9 Janna Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 3 
(2000): 341. 
10 Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” 7. 
11 Ibid., 8. 
12 Ibid., 10. 
13 Ibid., 11. 
14 Ibid. 
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groups were acting rationally, within their self-interest. Waldron argues that no one acts in their 
best interest all the time, but yet everyone is held to the consequences of their actions.15 It would 
be unfair to hold only some groups responsible and other groups not. In effect, those Waldron 
critiques are giving “rational choice motivations to only some, and not all, of the parties who are 
affected.”16 It is his view that this uneven ascription of rational choice is unfair. 
While I believe this first case is very sound up to this point, one difficulty I perceive is 
Waldron’s assertion that giving some historical actors rational choice and not others is unfair. 
Implicit in this view is that events were fair up until one unjust event or one counterfactual 
rational choice ascription. The perceived injustice at issue may not always be strictly in the 
result, or present conditions. Sometimes the issue in question is the freedom of choice of both 
actors. Examining the past we can come to conclusions about how constrained an individual or 
group’s choices were vis-à-vis someone else’s choices. In the example of aboriginal land 
appropriations, one group was being colonized and was at a severe disadvantage. There are more 
than just the present circumstances of aboriginals contributing to their case. Which is more 
unfair: past or present conditions? My objection is not without its own difficulties, but I think the 
issue of constraint (rather than result) is what leads people to ‘fairly’ employ counterfactual and 
rational choice approaches to moral judgments. But whatever inequities exist between two 
actors, Waldron is also concerned with third parties affected by this approach. 
He brings up the “contagion of injustice”: whereby acts of reparation negatively impact 
neutral parties, via mechanisms like the market.17 When injustice is created by attempts to ‘right’ 
past injustice a dilemma exists. Does one injustice weigh more heavily than another? Add this to 
                                                
15 Ibid., 12-13. 
16 Ibid., 13. 
17 Ibid., 11-12. 
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the other questions Waldron has asked of the counterfactual approach: Who gets rational choice? 
What will rational choice make one do? How would these counterfactuals be impacted by other 
actors? These are all questions a simplistic view of reparations cannot answer. 
Thompson refutes Waldron’s arguments about counterfactuals by asking: ‘who must prove 
what?’ She interprets Waldron’s view as requiring those with historical claims to land to “prove 
that they would have inherited their tribal land.”18 She believes this places a “burden of proof” 
on those with historical grievances when it should be placed on “those who deny the claims.”19 
Furthermore, she thinks that if a group might have acted against their self-interest in these 
counterfactual scenarios we cannot necessarily “deny the duty of make recompense” to these 
groups.20 I would agree that obligations do not disappear because of the contingent nature of 
history and I think Waldron would agree.  
Waldron’s criticism is that the standard position in favour of reparation, using a 
counterfactual approach, does not have the grounds to make demands for action. He is correct in 
suggesting these judgments are difficult to arrive at. It is also difficult to justify redistributing 
resources from one group to another based on predictions and conjecture. Thompson makes a 
good case for why his criticism cannot do away with historical obligations, but that is not his 
explicit purpose in his first objection. His arguments successfully complicate how we should 
arrive at reparation and Thompson does not adequately answer that objection.  
The second way Waldron ‘complicates’ historical obligations is by suggesting entitlements 
fade with time. This is a response to the view that holds certain injustices are “persisting” and 
                                                
18 Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” 342. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
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sometimes “remitting” a resource, like land, will rectify the injustice.21 There is no need to 
counterfactually reconstruct history; something simply needs to be remitted. On pragmatic 
grounds, Waldron suggests the principle of the “statute of limitations” may apply in cases where 
injustice “occurred decades or generations ago.”22 Additionally, the “structures of expectation” 
people may have around a resource, such as land, are greater for those who have used the 
resource for an established period of time.23 Over time, the claim that land is central to one’s way 
of life is not as convincing as the time spent away from the land increases. In some cases, the 
time period is so great that claimants are appealing to their ancestor’s claim. In this respect, it is 
sometimes not pragmatic to remit resources if too much time has passed. Waldron does note 
some exceptions to this. Religious or cultural considerations may remain “credible” over time 
and indeed might “have an edge” over opponents of aboriginal land claims.24 
Entitlements can also fade because the nature of rights (such as a right to land) can be 
shown to be prescriptive, rather than absolute. Waldron uses the example of two actors who 
appropriated the same piece of land.25 The first actor appropriated it when no one had a claim to 
it; the second appropriated it from out under the first actor. Despite the two actions being the 
same, one was wrong and one was not. Thus, the type of right to land we have in mind when 
discussing aboriginal land claims is “vulnerable to prescription.”26 Sometimes an individual or 
group has an entitlement, but this ‘prescriptive’ entitlement does not persist indefinitely if they 
are ‘dispossessed’ of the land for a long period of time.27  
                                                
21 Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” 14. 
22 Ibid., 16. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 19. 
25 Ibid., 18. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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It is Waldron’s link between dispossession and injustice that leads me to the greatest 
conflict in his paper. Waldron casts the type of historical grievances he discusses here as 
“precisely” about the ‘dispossession’ of land.28 He ignores other, more intangible forms of 
injustice in this argument. Thompson finds a similar objection to Waldron here. She enumerates 
the other injustices associated with appropriation of aboriginal land as broken promises, 
slaughter, theft and not recognizing aboriginal’s entitlements or humanity.29 She lists injustices 
that are perpetual and “resist being superseded by time.”30 Thompson’s assessment of Waldron’s 
“weakness” is valid; he does seem to only be considering “possession.”31 More generally, 
Waldron concentrates on a ‘material’ view of justice.  
By a material view I mean one focused on tangible conditions that can be transactional or 
economic in nature. Theft and murder are material forms of injustice. In contrast, the intangible 
forms of injustice are harder to enumerate and can impact emotions, cultures, or other social 
structures. Colonialism has intangible elements: cultural shifts, emotional trauma, and political 
destabilization. Waldron does not adequately address these types of intangible injustices when he 
suggests injustices fade with time. Waldron does note that past injustice carries into the present,32 
but he is still considering a ‘material’ injustice. While his case is not rendered invalid because of 
this omission, it might be best to understand Waldron as engaging only ‘material’ injustice in his 
arguments. Nonetheless, it is likely that intangible forms of injustice are liable to have just as 
many difficulties being ‘righted.’ 
                                                
28 Ibid., 15. 
29 Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” 343. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” 7. 
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Waldron further complicates historical obligations by arguing that changes in 
circumstances can sometimes change what is unjust. The changes he has in mind are in 
population, resources, and “the occurrence of famine or ecological disaster,” among others.33 
When circumstances such as these ‘fluctuate’ there are “variations in what we would take to be 
the appropriate level of concern,” and thus variations in reparation, for certain groups.34 
Surveying different views, Waldron concludes that if a certain “acquisition” would negatively 
impact “the prospects and life chances of other people,” then the legitimacy of the acquisition is 
questioned. 35  He also believes that a “spectrum of social circumstances” exists: some 
circumstances make something right, some circumstances make something wrong. When these 
circumstances change, actions once perfectly fine are no longer legitimate. Thus, certain 
entitlements “cannot be taken for granted,” in the face of changing circumstances. 36 
Additionally, the capacity for justice to become injustice over time parallels the capacity of 
injustice to become just over time. It is possible, in Waldron’s view, for an injustice to “be 
transformed…into a just situation if circumstances change.”37 This is what he calls superseding 
historical injustice.38 
Waldron employs an example to illustrate how something once wrong can become right. In 
the example, there are a number groups in one area, each with a corresponding water hole to 
which they have exclusive access.39 He then introduces an event that dries up all the water holes 
but one. This requires two groups to share a water hole, a fair arrangement under the 
                                                
33 Ibid., 20. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 21. 
36 Ibid., 22. 
37 Ibid., 24. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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circumstances. He then asks what if, before the other holes dried up, a group ‘descended’ on 
another’s water hole and demanded it be shared.40 That action would be quite unjust, but once all 
other water holes dried up it would “no longer [count] as an injustice.”41 This example is rather 
lean, but I will defend it. We may be uncomfortable accepting that simply because circumstances 
changed an injustice disappears. Can injustice dry up like a waterhole? Keeping in mind 
Waldron’s analysis of injustice as primarily a material condition: Yes. A material injustice is 
contingent on material conditions only. When those conditions change to an arrangement that is 
no longer unjust, such as only one waterhole remaining in an area, the material injustice no 
longer exists. The injustice that remains is the intangible injustice that Waldron generally ignores 
in his paper. Despite this intangible injustice remaining, the material component of injustice is no 
longer in place. I believe Waldron’s suggestion that changing circumstances can transform or 
even negate obligations to right material injustice is a sound view. 
Waldron does not use this view to negate “all claims of injustice”; rather, he uses it to 
criticize claims when the circumstances “that have changed are exactly the sort” that “make a 
difference” to the entitlements we are considering.42 He does note that many aboriginal land 
claim issues are impacted by changes in population, resources and the like.43 Indeed, the 
“occupation of some of their lands, which was previously wrongful, may become morally 
permissible,” according to his view.44 Again, supersession of injustice is not “always” the case,45 
but it is a “possibility.”46 Thompson does not entertain that possibility. 
                                                
40 Ibid., 25. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 25-6. 
43 Ibid., 26. 
44 Ibid., 25. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid., 26. 
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The changes in circumstances described by Waldron do not dispel any “obligation to make 
restitution for historical injustice,” according to Thompson.47 These changes do not mean “no 
entitlements” or “no historical obligations” exist.48 She admits changes in circumstances “affect 
historical duties and entitlements” and reparation “will sometimes have to be rejected in the 
interests of justice.”49 Indeed, sometimes they “may be a reason for re-negotiating” conditions.50 
I agree with Thompson that you cannot do away with all historical obligations in this way. 
Similarly, so does Waldron. While he presents a necessarily hard line for how particular cases 
may be completely refuted, he does not seek to apply this to all or even most cases. His argument 
“is not that the passage of time…supersedes all claims of injustice. Rather…that claims about 
justice and injustice must be responsive to changes in circumstances.”51 He has Thompson’s 
same re-negotiation in mind when he writes circumstances “make a difference” to the “set of 
entitlements.”52 The entitlements are now different, not gone. For this reason, I do not evaluate 
Thompson’s critique of Waldron’s third argument as very strong. The areas she objects to are 
precisely the areas for which Waldron makes exceptions. She is not able to supersede his formula 
for superseding injustice.  
Another difficulty I perceive involves the type of re-negotiations employed in reparation. 
Both Thompson and Waldron (in different degrees) seem to advocate for this re-assessment. It 
seems to me that the idea of re-negotiations supposes we can adequately compensate for the 
change of circumstances over time. In some ways, this goes back to Waldron’s argument against 
counterfactuals. If we hold that we cannot calculate reparations based on the contingent nature of 
                                                
47 Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” 344. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Waldron, “Superseding Historic Injustice,” 25. 
52 Ibid., 26. 
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history, how can re-negotiation have the moral foundation to determine new reparations or new 
agreements? It would require great care, but some forms of re-negotiation based on observable, 
factual conditions may avoid this problem. Nevertheless, I suggest this problem will exist for 
many cases. 
In principle, I agree with Jeremy Waldron’s arguments for superseding historical 
obligations. His arguments are not invulnerable to criticism, but they present the better case. 
First, we cannot base reparations on counterfactuals, no matter who this places the ‘burden of 
proof’ upon. Second, some entitlements can fade over time, but these are primarily material in 
nature. Waldron ignores many intangible forms of injustice that survive his arguments and this 
critique of Waldron is Thompson’s strongest. Third, changing circumstances can change the 
nature of material injustice and in some cases, quite conclusively. It is Waldron’s method of 
rendering at least some types of historical injustices undone and denying obligations based on 
them that is his strongest charge. With all of his exceptions and stipulations, I agree that this 
position is valid. Sometimes past injustice is no longer present today, and when it is present it 
has likely changed shape. I believe it is necessary to ‘complicate’ our view on what obligations 
arise from past injustices, whether they are superseded, transformed, or perpetual. Using well-
reasoned and thoughtful approaches to these questions ensures that cycles of injustice can be 
stopped and that present-day justice is served fully. Citizens living with historical obligations 
today should not want to create new historical obligations for their successors.  
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SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: 
MOVING FORWARD WITH DIMINISHED IMPUNITY FOR CRIMES AND 
INCREASED SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS 
 
Madeleine Gorman 
 
 
The scope of this paper is far narrower than the scope of the conflict itself. What will be treated 
in these pages cannot even be said to constitute the tip of the iceberg of sexual violence in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is only a part of a far greater conflict. In light of 
the recent release of the United Nations’ (UN) “Mapping Report,” this paper deals mainly with 
sexual violence perpetrated in the eastern DRC from 1993-2003. The instances that are 
addressed here have been chosen as representative of the nature of the conflict because they 
illustrate the specific challenges faced in bringing perpetrators to justice. Many of the proposed 
legal approaches to post-conflict rebuilding in the DRC take transitional justice mechanisms into 
account. Due to the severity and magnitude of social and psychological trauma suffered, 
transitional justice has an important role to play beyond the legal context in the DRC.  
 
“In modern wars, the greatest casualties of the conflict are civilians.
1 During these attacks, female civilians are subjected to the same violence to which male 
civilians are subjected. Both are murdered, tortured, displaced, imprisoned, starved and 
subjected to slave labour. Yet in addition to these crimes, women and girls are also singled out 
for additional violence – gendered violence – that is commonly manifested in the form of sexual 
violence.”2 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the Congolese context, the severity of the sexual violence problem is largely attributed to 
continued impunity and a lack of institutional independence of the judiciary. International 
opinion generally treats transitional justice methods, like special courts and tribunals, as being 
essential to the establishment of peace and the re-building of Congolese society. According to 
the UN Mapping Report, a mixed chamber is the most appropriate style of transitional justice 
court system for this particular context. Beyond overcoming the pervasive impunity associated 
                                                
1 Kelly D. Askin, “Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law: 
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles,” Berkeley Journal of International Law 21, no.2 (2003):  
297. 
2UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting 
the most serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law committed within the 
territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between March 1993 and June 2003, August 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ca99bc22.html.[Report of the Mapping Exercise]. 
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with sexual violence in the DRC, special resources must be developed to provide direct aid and 
assistance to the victims of sexual violence. Not only will this encourage victim-witnesses to 
come forward, it will also help victims and their communities to rebuild and reconcile. This 
paper examines viable legal and social remedies for victims of sexual violence in the context of 
widespread impunity in the DRC. The most essential of these are providing adequate medical, 
psychological and economic aid to victims of sexual violence. These resources are required to 
help ease trauma and, ideally, to facilitate their participation in the peace-building process. The 
increased visibility of women in the public sphere is also integral to post-conflict rebuilding in 
the DRC. 
II. A Brief History of Conflict in the DRC 
Mobutu’s reign as President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire) came to a violent 
end during the First Congo War.3 There was decreased political stability in the DRC in the three 
years leading up to this clash. At the same time, the declining Zairian state was faced with the 
devastating aftermath of the Rwandan genocide. 4  This particularly affected the eastern 
Congolese province of North Kivu, which shares a border with western Rwanda. The First 
Congo War and the commencement of President Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s violent regime 
occurred between July 1996 and July 1998. This period was characterized by extensive 
violations of international law, including the mass killing of Hutu refugees5 and of members of 
militia involved in the Rwandan genocide. 6  Many different countries contributed to the 
instability and violence at this time, which showed a dramatic increase in serious attacks on 
civilians in all provinces. The attacks are particularly attributed to the retreating Forces Armées 
                                                
3 The First Congo War took place from November 1996 to May 1997. 
4 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 17. 
5 The UN Mapping Report documents 104 reported incidents.  
6 Ibid., para 18. 
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Zaïroises,7 the ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises8 and the Mayi-Mayi.9 From the start of the Second 
Congo War in August 1998, and the death of Kabila, the Mapping Report documents 200 
incidents of violence committed against civilians. The period is marked by regional intervention 
by forces from at least eight national armies and 21 irregular armed groups fighting either for or 
against the Forces Armées Congolaises.10 The 2002 signings of the Pretoria Agreement with 
Rwanda and the Luanda Agreement with Uganda began the withdrawal of foreign forces from 
the DRC.11 This by no means brought an end to the violence endured by Congolese civilians. 
Armed conflict and flagrant violations of human rights and international law have continued up 
to present day. Sexual violence rates have soared in this long period of instability and incredibly 
brutal violence. The extended conflict has led to the normalization of this type of crime to the 
extent that it now represents a large portion of the war crimes committed. 
The UN has named the DRC the “rape capital of the world” with an estimated 15,000 
women raped in eastern Congo in the last year alone.12 The Rwandan genocide exodus in 1994 
led to the mass migration of more than 1,000,000 Rwandans into the Congo, mostly Hutus.13 
Prior to this population change, and prior to the brutal Congolese civil wars in 1996 and 1998, 
                                                
7 FAZ, national army of Zaire. 
8 FAR, national army of Rwanda before July 1994. 
9 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 18.  
The term ‘Mayi-Mayi’ is used to designate groups that resort to magic rituals such as water ablutions 
(“mayi” in Swahili) and carry amulets prepared by witchdoctors that they believe make them invincible. 
The Mayi-Mayi groups have included warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads and local political 
leaders. Some of the most violent use of sexual violence can allegedly be attributed to them. 
10 Ibid., para 19. FAC, Forces Armées Congolaises (national army of the DRC from June 1997). 
11 Ibid., para 19; Pretoria Agreement of 30 July 2002 between the DRC and Rwanda (S/2002/914, 
Annex), Article 8, para 3, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=33230;  
Luanda Agreement of 6 September 2002 between the DRC and Uganda, Article 1, 
www.droitcongolais.info/files/0426_accord of_6_September_2002_rdc-ouganda_r.pdf. 
12 Nima Elbagir, “Congolese rape victims march against sexual violence,” CNN, October 17, 2010, 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-10-17/world/congo.rapes.march_1_congo-women-congolese-democratic-
republic?_s=PM:WORLD. 
13  CNN Wire Staff, “UN Releases ‘heartbreaking’ human rights report on Congo,” CNN, October 1, 
2010, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/10/01/congo.atrocities.un.report/index.html. 
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the eastern provinces already had a high rape rate; however, rape was not attributed to military 
activity as it now is. Formerly, rape in the DRC was linked to women’s low legal status in 
traditional and civil realms. The rapes during the pre-conflict period are described as having 
occurred when a male “admirer” raped a girl who had gone off to gather resources or farm. It 
was customary in these cases for the matter to be settled privately between the families. This 
normally meant the two would be married or the perpetrator would pay restitution to the girl’s 
family in the form of one or two goats.14 This so-called solution to rape is completely 
unacceptable. It binds victims to their aggressor, which creates further opportunities for sexual 
violence, and in the Congolese context the marriage contract provides social validation for future 
attacks as a private issue. Since 1993, there have been extraordinarily high levels of violent rape 
being perpetrated by military aggressors. As a result, rape and sexual violence have reached the 
community level. These crimes are now so normalized in the DRC that civilians often rape in 
order to settle minor transgressions or old personal scores.15 Such a harmful value shift toward 
the violent commoditization of women is likely to take generations to reverse and will severely 
inhibit civilian progress in the region.16  
III. Range of Attitudes toward Rape 
During armed conflict, “women are often killed in a gender-related manner”; rather than simply 
being murdered, their murder is sexualized.17 The international community has been slow to 
recognize this practice as an element of warfare. The prosecution of perpetrators of sexual 
                                                
14 Marion Pratt et al., Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo, USAID/DCHA Assessment Report (January 9-16, 2004): 9. 
15 There was one instance where a girl was raped by the owner of a mango tree for taking a fruit without 
asking. Ibid., 9-10 
16 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Now, The World Is Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, A Report by the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative 
With Support from Oxfam America (2010), http://hhi.harvard.edu/programs-and-research/gender-based-
violence. 
17 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 298. 
15
Chartrand: Complicating Obligations Arising from Past Injustice
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010
  4 
violence and adequate accountability to their victims has been even slower and is still 
unacceptably rare. Rape has traditionally been treated as a crime motivated by sexuality, rather 
than by violence and abusive exercise of power. Nevertheless, sexual violence is finally being 
acknowledged internationally as a violation of human rights and humanitarian law worth 
devoting resources to addressing. A milestone in this progress was the 1998 codification of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute recognizes the use of 
sexual violence as a war crime and a crime against humanity.18 This change reflects the inclusion 
of women’s rights into the structures of international humanitarian law, which addresses these 
crimes in the mainstream, rather than marginalizing them as a side effect of war.19 According to 
the Rome Statute, depending on the context in which crimes are committed, “crime against 
humanity” and “war crime” may be applied to “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, forced sterilization and any other form of sexual violence of a comparable 
severity.”20  While this expanded definition of “war crime” is able to better address the 
widespread use of sexual violence in the DRC, its application may not be possible due to 
restrictive temporal jurisdiction rules. Despite official legislative attempts to protect women and 
children from sexual violence,21 and despite the frequent presence of the issue on the agenda of 
the UN Security Council, this does not translate into actual protection, especially during times of 
                                                
18International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/9, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm. Another groundbreaking advance 
made by the Rome Statute is the broadening of the definition of war crimes beyond war to include 
internal armed conflict. This extension of the definition is particularly important because the armed 
conflict in the DRC involves many different factions who are not always affiliated with an official 
military movement. 
19 Marleen Bosmans, “Challenges in Aid to Rape Victims: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,” Essex Human Rights Review 4, no. 1 (2007): 3. 
20 International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998, UN Doc 
A/CONF.183/9, Article 7 g, para 1 b xxii) and e vi), and Article 8, para 2. 
21 Violence against women and children, including sexual violence, was explicitly incorporated into the 
new Congolese Constitution, which was approved in December 2005. Constitution de la République 
démocratique du Congo, Kinshasa, Feb 18, 2006, Articles 14, 15, and 41, 
http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Constitution_de_la_RDC.pdf.  
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conflict.22 In addition, resources specifically allocated to medical assistance for those who have 
been subjected to sexual violence remains extremely scarce and there is little in place to address 
the long-term, psychological trauma suffered by many women. 
i. Effect of Rape on the Community 
Often, in other African conflicts, military actors carry out rapes when women go off in search of 
water or food, when farming in the fields, or when their village is attacked.23 In the DRC the 
rapes are not limited to this scenario. They usually occur in victims’ homes, during daylight 
hours and with no apparent provocation. Armed militants have introduced gang rape, rape with 
foreign objects, genital mutilation, and the taking of women as sexual slaves.24 These attacks 
effectively destroy future generations by killing men and children and by injuring the women so 
badly they are left infertile. Another result of these attacks is a rape birth rate, since abortion is 
illegal in the DRC. In some cases, rapes have been apparently committed in an attempt to force 
pregnancies to alter the ethnic makeup of the targeted communities.25 Additionally, homes are 
frequently burnt in this severely impoverished region, which traumatizes survivors further and 
makes it even more difficult for the targeted communities to rebuild.26  
Sexual violence and military rape have been established as a part of a broad attempt to 
destabilize civilian life. These brutal acts are often deliberately committed in the presence of the 
community in order to humiliate, objectify and terrorize civilians into submission.27 The struggle 
over rich natural resources in the DRC is largely responsible for the regional conflicts and 
                                                
22 Bosmans, “Challenges in Aid to Rape Victims: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” 3. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Now, The World Is Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 45. 
25 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 609. 
26 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, “Now, The World Is Without Me”: An Investigation of Sexual 
Violence in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 45. 
27 Ibid. 
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instability makes it easier for military aggressors to pillage the villages and exploit the land. Loss 
of life is not a concern to military groups and civilians have become the target of brutal attacks.28 
These attacks often lead inhabitants to abandon their homes and flee their villages.29 Since many 
of the armed groups are operating with extremely limited supplies, rape is offered as a reward for 
military victories and the looting of victims’ homes is treated as payment for their service.30 
Beyond these tangible harms, these communities also suffer unspeakable psychological and 
emotional trauma as a result of sexual violence.31  
ii. Women and Children as a Military Target 
Rape has a staggering effect on communities because women are integral to subsistence 
agriculture in the DRC.32 They generally “account for 73% of those economically active in 
agriculture and produce more than 80% of the food crops.”33 For safety reasons, many women do 
not go to work in the fields during times of conflict and instability. Injuries sustained during rape 
and sexual violence also frequently leave women physically unable to work. For this reason, 
sexual violence has a tremendous economic impact on these communities and often results in 
poverty and malnourishment. Communities in the DRC rely on women to raise children and 
produce food; this perpetuates an especially vicious cycle. The problem is compounded by the 
interruption of children’s education, as they must stay home from school to remain safe from 
                                                
28 Ibid., 41, 44.  
29 Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, Characterizing Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo: Profiles of Violence, Community Responses, and Implications for the Protection of Women, 
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative Final Report for the Open Society (2009), 
http://hhi.harvard.edu/programs-and-research/gender-based-violence. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Pratt et al., Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 7. 
33 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Women, agriculture and rural development: 
a synthesis report of Africa (2003), http://www.fao.org/docrep/X0250e03.htm#TopOfPage. 
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attacks. 34  This disruption has a severely negative impact on productivity and it further 
jeopardizes the communities’ survival. 
Traditional patriarchal views on gender are prevalent in the DRC, where husbands and 
fathers treat women as lesser members of society. Due to customary belief in the value of a 
woman’s purity and the importance of a pure bloodline, Congolese culture views the victim as 
defiled after rape. This attitude is exacerbated by general fear surrounding the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS, which is prevalent in the region. Due to this predominant mentality, husbands 
frequently abandon their wives after these types of attacks. Adding to the problem of 
abandonment, women are not customarily permitted to own property. This means that, following 
rape, when families cast out women or girls, it leaves them in dire economic conditions.35 Often 
they are faced with the additional burden of having to provide for their children, whether 
conceived with the abandoning husband or as a result of the rape.  
Abortion is illegal in the DRC and, traditionally, Congolese families are either unable or 
unwilling to adopt orphans and unwanted children. This is linked to extreme poverty and the 
perceived importance of a pure patriarchal bloodline. Due to the extraordinarily frequent 
occurrences of sexual violence, there is a now a generation of children resulting from the rape of 
their mothers. According to a 2001 report, Human Rights Watch estimates that at least 5000 
children resulted from the Rwandan genocide, but it is unknown how many such children were 
born in the DRC, where the conflict has lasted almost 20 years. These children are often rejected 
or abandoned by their mothers who themselves have frequently been abandoned by their 
husbands and families. Beyond the unimaginable difficulty for a mother to have a child born out 
of such a traumatic event, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
                                                
34 Pratt et al., Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 13. 
35 Ibid., 12. 
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discovered, not surprisingly, that the children themselves suffer as well. There is no 
infrastructure in place to protect or to raise these children, who have been labeled ‘children of 
hate’ or ‘unwanted children’ by their communities.36 Children who are suspected or known to be 
rape children are excluded from their communities and are likely severely traumatized by their 
origins.37 The reality of the rape birth rate is almost without mention in many studies on the 
conflict, which is a grave oversight. These children are members of the generation who will 
hopefully bring peace to the region. As such, their sense of equality must be established now, 
rather than corrected later on. Further, these women and children will be profoundly traumatized 
and will need special, long-term psychological care. 
In Resolution 61/143 of 19 December 2006, the General Assembly acknowledged that 
women and girls are specifically targeted and victimized by sexual violence.38 This targeting will 
significantly exacerbate the peace-building process in situations of armed conflict, post-armed 
conflict, and refugee and internally displaced person settings. The connection between these 
crimes and the aggravation of conflicts is clear in the DRC, where sexual violence is openly used 
as a retaliation tactic between communities or militias. It is also used to punish communities for 
allegedly supporting another political party or armed faction. The logic behind this use of 
violence is inherently flawed. Retaliatory rape assumes that villages support the militias who 
terrorize their community. In reality, it is far more likely that these villagers fear their aggressors. 
Thus, the so-called retaliation is punishment for an allegiance they do not bear. In repeatedly- 
targeted communities, the brutality escalates from one attack to the next, as each military group 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 USAID reported that Congolese children born of rape are teased and called “Hutus,” referring to the 
suspected nationality of the rapist-father. Ibid. 
38 UN General Assembly, Resolution 61/43, “Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence 
against women,” January 30, 2007, para 8, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/GA_Res 
_VAW_2007.pdf; UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping 
Exercise, para 549. 
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tries to outdo the other.39 In the rebel-controlled zone, for example, during the conflict between 
the Mayi-Mayi and the Armée Nationale Congolaise40 /Armée Patriotique Rwandaise,41 and also 
in some regions controlled by the Centre National pour la Défense de la Démocratie42 / Front 
pour la Défense de la Démocratie,43 each militia attempted to establish and sustain power by 
being the most fearsome group. Women, who were specifically targeted, paid the dearest price.  
iii. The Under-Reporting of Sexual Violence in Conflict 
The belief that rape is an inevitable by-product of armed conflict is profoundly damaging to all 
efforts to bring perpetrators to justice. It manifests itself in different ways. For example, the end 
of the First Congo War brought an end to the FAZ / Mobutu regime. When they retreated, the 
Alliances Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo44 / Armée Patriotique Rwandaise45 
seized control of government and began a reign of terror. There was so much violence and such a 
great deal of life lost that published reports covering the conflict in this period do not bother to 
distinguish sexual violence from the other crimes committed.46 This is indicative of the general 
attitude toward these types of offences. By under-reporting sexual violence, sources reinforce the 
treatment of these crimes as separate from armed conflict, which they are not. It also upholds the 
view that instances of sexual violence are somehow secondary or less atrocious than the violence 
of war, which they certainly are not. The UN Secretary General’s Investigative Team was tasked 
                                                
39 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, paras 580-
585. 
40 ANC, armed wing of Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma. Here, the ANC is grouped 
with the APR because, due to similarities in the clothing and regional presence of the two groups, it was 
difficult for victims to distinguish which group perpetrators belonged to. For the same reason, other 
military groups are often mentioned together, separated by a “/”. 
41 APR, national army of Rwanda from 1994-2002. 
42 CNDD, Burundian Hutu Movement. 
43 FDD, armed wing of CNDD. 
44 AFDL, Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo. 
45 APR, national army of Rwanda from 1994-2002. 
46 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 565. 
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with investigating serious human rights and international humanitarian law violations in the 
DRC. They reported that rapes were likely to have been committed by the AFDL/APR during the 
reported attacks on the five large refugee camps in North Kivu in October/November of 1996.47 
Even with this acknowledgement, the Investigative Team does not give any details. They treat 
the sexual violence as outside the human rights and international humanitarian law violations 
that were actually included in the report.48 The exclusion of sexual violence from reports and 
criminal charges is inexplicable, given that it has been on the UN’s agenda since the Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC) asked the UN General Assembly to adopt the Declaration on the 
Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict in 1974.49 This area of 
law has developed an enormous deal since 1974, making it all the more remarkable that sexual 
violence is still being treated as peripheral in conflict reporting, peace-building and conflict 
resolution. 
“The impressive struggle of local NGOs, human rights advocates, health personnel, 
religious groups, and survivors to deal with and address sexual violence in eastern Congo is 
unfortunately being undermined by attitudes toward rape encountered by the assessment team in 
different sites in the eastern DRC.”50 Rape was formerly a taboo issue, but the events of the last 
few decades have brought it abruptly into the open and into the international media. This has 
caused embarrassment among the Congolese people. Due to their deeply ingrained patriarchal 
attitudes toward women, many Congolese men describe feelings of humiliation after the women 
in their families have fallen victim to sexual violence. When these men claim the harm suffered 
as their own, rather than acknowledging the suffering of their wives and daughters, it objectifies 
                                                
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 UN Division for the Advancement of Women, Sexual Violence and Armed Conflict: United Nations 
Response, April 1998, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/w2apr98.htm#part1. 
50 Pratt et al, Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 13. 
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the victims even further. Due to strict gender roles, this reaction poses a significant risk factor for 
further violence in the form of male attempts to reassert control.51 Humiliation also leads sexual 
violence to be dismissed as a mere side effect of war and armed conflict. Unfortunately, this 
attitude is prevalent among those in positions of power, which weakens prevention efforts and 
reinforces or encourages judicial impunity. USAID has reported that in North Kivu, one 
commander of a sub-office in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo52 told several members of the team that rape was “normal” 
and predictable behaviour from soldiers who were deprived of contact with women.53 Another 
USAID assessment team was told that one representative at the highest levels of transitional 
government was overheard referring to rape as a “women’s” issue that should be dealt with by 
women.54 This is an unacceptable view for MONUSCO officials to hold privately, much less to 
speak of in public. It strongly suggests that reports of rape by survivors or by particularly hard-
hit communities will not be taken seriously, and they frequently are not. A dismissive attitude 
toward sexual violence among individuals in power affects more than the opinions of others in 
office. It is reflected in the fact that charges are never actually brought forward in the vast 
majority of rape cases.  
The DRC has very strong customary laws that favour men over women. Sexual violence 
is not treated as of equal importance as general conflict violence because the primary victims are 
women. These crimes have a decidedly gendered aspect where, normally, men assert their power 
over women by dehumanizing and commoditizing them. This is not a primarily sexual act, as 
some people mistakenly believe. It is a decidedly political act. Nevertheless, the gendered aspect 
                                                
51 Sunita Kishor and Kiersten Johnson, Profiling Domestic Violence – A Multi-­‐Country Study (Calverton, 
Maryland: ORC Macro, 2004). 
52 MONUSCO as of July 1, 2010. 
53 Pratt et al., Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 13. 
54 Ibid. 
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of these crimes results in its marginalization and its dismissal as either a “women’s issue,” as a 
matter that is secondary to the military conflict, or worse, as “natural” behaviour that is to be 
expected of soldiers who are isolated from women for long periods of time.  
iv. United Nations Mapping Report 
In October 2010, the UN issued a Mapping Report, which documented human rights 
violations committed in the Congo from 1993 to 2003. Congolese diplomat Ileka Atoko 
responded to the report, calling it “detailed, credible and heartbreaking.”55 The Mapping Report 
is the first of its kind to deal with human rights offences during the conflict in the DRC. It notes 
the involvement of at least 21 armed Congolese groups in the violations and it also recognizes 
military operations by eight foreign states inside the DRC.56 The report addresses more than 600 
offences and claims and “the majority of the incidents of sexual violence reported, could if 
judicially proven, constitute offences and violations under domestic law, international human 
rights law, and international humanitarian law.”57 The Report does not, however, claim to meet 
the evidentiary standard required to try these offences in court. 58  Upon their eventual 
prosecution, thorough investigations of these crimes will still need to be conducted. The report is 
not designed to be trial-ready. It is designed to find ways “to deal with the legacy of these 
violations, in terms of truth, justice, reparation and reform, taking into account ongoing efforts 
by the DRC authorities, as well as the support of the international community.”59 The Mapping 
Report attempts to establish factual accounts of the crimes being committed so that healing and 
reform can take place. In this way, it resembles the goal of some transitional justice mechanisms, 
                                                
55 Ibid. 
56 CNN Wire Staff, “UN Releases ‘heartbreaking’ human rights report on Congo,” CNN, October 1, 2010, 
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/10/01/congo.atrocities.un.report/index.html. 
57 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 35. 
58 Relief Web, “Analysis: Justice still remote for victims of atrocities in DRC,” October 11, 2010, 
http://wwww.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/VDUX-8A5JZ7?OpenDocument. 
59 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 89. 
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such as truth commissions. The Report devotes specific and focused attention to sexual violence 
against women and children as part of military tactics employed by all combatant forces involved 
in the conflict. 
There are multiple forms of sexual violence in the DRC. The Mapping Report breaks 
them down into somewhat superficial categories, but they help to give a sense of the trauma and 
long-term psychological damage these attacks will have on the individual victims and their 
communities. Sexual violence as an instrument of terror includes torture and humiliation, forced 
rape between victims (including incest), a deliberate policy of spreading HIV/AIDS, and acts of 
sexual violence during military victories or defeats. Sexual violence committed on the basis of 
ethnicity and sexual violence committed in the name of ritual purposes are sometimes connected, 
as it is believed by some Mayi-Mayi that Pygmy women have healing powers.60 Sexual slavery 
has also been prevalent, where individuals are held for sexual purposes for more than 24 hours, 
and often for months. Within the category of sexual slavery falls the particular case of child 
soldiers. It was common practice that female Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed 
Groups would be forced to serve as sex slaves or “wives” for the commanding officers.61 In 
addition to this practice was the inculcation of male child soldiers into the practice of rape. Male 
CAAFAGs, known as Kadogo,62 were forced to commit rape or other brutal acts, supposedly in 
order to toughen them up. If they refused, they would be executed.63 Due to the uniqueness of 
                                                
60 For protection, some of these soldiers are known to have worn amulets made from the body parts of 
Pygmy women. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping 
Exercise, para 648. 
61 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, International Criminal Court 01/04-01/06, Transcription of 
hearings from Trial Chamber I (February 3, February 27, and March 6, 2009).  
CAAFAG, Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups.  
62 “Little ones” in DRC colloquial Swahili.  
63 Amnesty International, “Mass rape: Time for Remedies,” October 24, 2004, 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/018/2004/en/63b10028-d57f-11dd-bb24-
1fb85fe8fa05/afr620182004en.html. 
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this particular form of sexual violence, special measures will have to be taken at the trial stage to 
treat these crimes with the appropriate sensitivity.64 
IV. Climate of Impunity in the DRC  
“There is absolutely no doubt that the scale and gravity of acts of sexual violence are directly 
proportional to the victims’ lack of access to justice and that the impunity that has reigned in 
recent decades has made women even more vulnerable than they were before.”65 During the 
severe political transition at the national level in 2003, cases of rape and violence diminished 
noticeably as there were high expectations that law and order would be restored. When this new 
stability failed to materialize, perpetrators resumed their attacks on the population.66 This trend 
illustrates the nature of the relationship between impunity and sexual violence. As UN Special 
Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, Margo Wallström, has rightly said, “zero 
tolerance has been underpinned by zero consequences.”67  
Section III of the Mapping Report focuses on the Congolese justice system.68 Since 1993, 
ongoing civil war and armed conflict in the DRC has eroded many government institutions, 
including a breakdown of the justice system. This dysfunction remains a problem today. A lack 
of institutional independence and widespread corruption has made the system untrustworthy and 
inefficient. In addition, many of the individuals suspected of responsibility for serious human 
                                                
64 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Report of the International parliamentary-expert mission addressing 
impunity for sexual crimes in the Democratic Republic of Congo: April 26 –May 3, 2008 (November 
2008), 43, http://www.humanrights.se/upload/files/2/Rapporter%20och%20seminariedok/DRC%20SG 
BV%20Mission%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. 
65 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 653. 
66 Pratt et al., Sexual Terrorism: Rape as a Weapon of War in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, 7. 
67 Barbara Plett, “Interview of Margot Wallström by BBC UN correspondent, Barbara Plett,” BBC video, 
2:03, October 14, 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11548090. 
68 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, paras 783-
979. 
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rights violations are now in senior government and military positions. The government has 
demonstrated an unwillingness to exclude these individuals from the benefits of peace 
agreements. Some of them were promoted in the military ranks in 2002 when their groups were 
integrated into the national army.69 The promotion of these culprits into institutions that have 
official control over the nationwide use of force has left millions of victims, who are now 
legitimately under the power of their aggressors, with nowhere to safely report the crimes 
committed against their communities.70 Wallström has urged that perpetrators of rape and sexual 
violence should be excluded from benefits of disarmament or amnesty provisions, prevented 
from returning to civilian life, and barred from any role in politics or government.71 So far, no 
action has been taken to this end. 
The serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law that were 
committed between 1993 and 2003 (and since) have generally been met with an attitude of near 
total impunity. At the time it was written, the Mapping Report noted that, “the exclusive 
competence of military courts over crimes under international law has resulted in growing 
impunity, as demonstrated by the very small number of investigations and prosecutions of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, despite the outrageous number of crimes committed.”72 
Under current Congolese domestic law, military courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try these 
crimes.73 Meanwhile, it is openly acknowledged that the DRC’s military courts lack the requisite 
political independence from the executive, legislative and administrative powers of the State. 
                                                
69 Ibid., para 1138. 
70 Ibid., para 977. This is one reason why the protection of victims, witnesses and main actors in the 
judicial system is vital to the effective prosecution of perpetrators holding positions of authority.  
71 Edith M. Lederer, “Congo Government Continuing Rapes: United Nations,” The Huffington Post, 
November 14, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/10/15/congo-government-rapes_n_ 
764439.html. 
72 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 974. 
73 Ibid., para 829. This refers to war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
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Both the Congolese public and the international community openly acknowledge political and 
military interference in the justice system.74 This means that the most serious crimes are simply 
not being tried in accordance with the principles of justice. The UN has condemned the 
Congolese judicial process as a serious problem, questioning “the capacity of the Congolese 
military authorities and judiciary – particularly in view of interference from political actors and 
the military command structure – to decisively address impunity and hold trials for serious 
human rights violations.”75 
Despite the DRC’s obligation under the Geneva Convention to curb serious breaches of 
human rights, the mapping team reports that, according to Congolese judicial authorities, “no 
judgment for war crimes or crimes against humanity had ever been issued under the Military 
Justice Code of 1972, which remained in force until 2003.”76 The military law was reformed in 
2003, after the 2002 signing of the Pretoria Agreement and the Luanda Agreement began the 
official withdrawal of Rwandan and Ugandan national forces. Since then, very few cases 
handling crimes against international law have been dealt with by the military jurisdiction 
currently in place. A near total impunity for these crimes has proven that offenders will not be 
held accountable and has served to encourage the perpetration of new and serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law.  
The Congolese public does not view the military courts as capable or reliable enough to 
fight the overwhelming impunity for the atrocious violations of their fundamental human 
rights.77 A preliminary report states that between 30 July and 2 August 2010, at least 303 
                                                
74 Ibid., para 929. 
75 Ibid., para 961. 
76 Ibid., paras 893-94. Of the multitude of violations of international law listed in the Mapping Report to 
have been committed from March 1993 to June 2003, military tribunals have only addressed two crimes 
that can be classified as war crimes, one of which resulted in the acquittal of all accused. Ibid. para 890. 
77 Ibid., para 979. 
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civilians were raped during an attack on villages in the Walikale region in North Kivu.78 After 
these attacks, the government placed a moratorium on mining in the region and sent in national 
military to secure peace. There were soon reports that the military had perpetrated rapes on the 
same community they were sent to protect.79 In response to these horrendous events, Wallström 
declared, “When commanders can no longer rest easy in the certainty of impunity; when it 
begins to cross their mind that they may be turned in by their own for commissioning or 
condoning rape; this is the moment when we open a new front in the battle to end impunity.”80 
Congolese armed forces should be thoroughly vetted in order to remove soldiers and officers 
suspected of having committed atrocities against civilians.81 
V. Legal Frameworks Applicable to Sexual Violence 
Article 15 of the Congolese Constitution includes sexual violence as a crime against humanity, 
and a 2006 revision includes rape with objects to criminal legislation. “Law No06/019 of 20 July 
2006 on sexual violence provides that the victim is entitled to the assistance of legal counsel 
during all phases of the judicial procedure. It is not specified who will provide the victim with 
this counsel, but the State obviously has a key responsibility, at least to guarantee the rights to a 
fair trial and an effective remedy.”82 The DRC Sexualized and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) 
delegation of the Swedish Foundation for Human Rights found no examples where the 
Congolese state used its resources to undertake this responsibility; once again, legislative 
                                                
78 UN News Centre, “Preliminary UN report confirms over 300 rapes by rebels in eastern DR Congo,” 
September 24, 2010, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36129&Cr=democratic&Cr1 
=congo. 
79 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 977. 
80 Plett, “Interview of Margot Wallström by BBC UN correspondent, Barbara Plett.”  
81 Human Rights Watch, “Tackling Impunity in Congo: Meaningful Follow-up to the UN Mapping 
Report,” October 1, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/node/93228#_ftn4. 
82 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, para 25. 
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attempts exist on the page, rather than in the field.83 Regardless, this law does not apply to the 
period from 1993-2003.84 During that period, rape is defined under the narrow provisions of the 
1940 Congolese Criminal Code, which does not even remotely cover the full range of sex crimes 
perpetrated in the DRC. The Rome Statute definitions of these crimes are far more inclusive. The 
DRC has not yet adopted the Rome Statute into its domestic law, but this does not diminish the 
country’s ratification of the statute. Therefore, the DRC is still bound by the statute, but cannot 
try the crimes in their domestic courts until the appropriate legislative changes are made. The 
Rome Statute was not codified until 1998, which technically places a restriction on the start-date 
of the statutory temporal jurisdiction. By arguing that the offences listed in the Rome Statute 
were already customary international law in 1996, the Special Court for Sierra Leone was able to 
overcome this temporal restriction. Professor Valerie Oosterveld of the Faculty of Law, 
University of Western Ontario, suggests this same standpoint can be argued in the case of the 
DRC. This would enable the use of crimes listed in the Rome Statute to prosecute offences 
committed from the beginning of the conflict in 1993.85  
i. Transitional Justice – Congolese Mixed Chamber  
The concept of transitional justice has developed as a response to instances where human rights 
are violated systematically or on a widespread scale. Its initiatives are developed in order to 
facilitate “recognition for victims and to promote possibilities for peace, reconciliation and 
democracy.”86 At present, transitional justice has been used as an approach to post-conflict 
rebuilding in countries emerging from a period when human rights offences were 
overwhelmingly pervasive. The general consensus in the international community is that 
                                                
83 Ibid., para 26. 
84 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 540. 
85 Personal email from Professor Valerie Oosterveld, November 30, 2010. 
86 International Center for Transitional Justice, “What is Transitional Justice?” January 18, 2011, 
http://www.ictj.org/en/tj/. 
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transitional justice is appropriate in the Congolese context, but still at issue is which types of 
transitional justice mechanisms should be implemented. The UN declared in Resolution 1820 
(2008) of the Security Council, dated 19 June 2008, that “sexual violence, when used or 
commissioned as a tactic of war in order to deliberately target civilians or as a part of a 
widespread or systematic attack against civilian populations, can significantly exacerbate 
situations of armed conflict and may impede the restoration of international peace and 
security.”87 The high prevalence of sexual violence in the DRC calls for transitional justice 
mechanisms to be established. These mechanisms must be designed to take prevalence into 
account, while remaining sensitive to the needs of the victims of sexual violence and their 
communities.88 This is a fundamental step toward rebuilding a Congolese society that will value 
women and in which women will be able to actively participate; it will require the correction of 
traditional political and structural inequalities between men and women. The small number of 
women in the judiciary also contributes to the overall impunity for crimes of sexual violence and 
will need to be increased over time. There must be major reforms of the justice and security 
sectors in order to combat the near total impunity for these crimes.  
There is currently draft legislation that will implement the Rome Statute of the ICC into 
Congolese domestic law. Once it is approved, the Rome Statute jurisdiction to try war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide will no longer be vested solely in the military courts. 
These crimes will move to the civilian courts. When this has been achieved, the DRC will need a 
court with the expertise and the judicial independence to try these crimes. The Congolese civil 
law system lacks adequate funding, personnel, transportation, training, professional 
                                                
87 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 654. 
88 Ibid. 
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development, witness protection, expertise, and judicial independence.89 To overcome these 
shortcomings, the Mapping Report indicates a strong preference for the creation of a hybrid court 
model called a “Mixed Chamber” that is made up of national and international staff.90 The 
involvement of international personnel will bring procedural expertise and will help to minimize 
the proven lack of capacity of the Congolese domestic justice system to function independently. 
Meanwhile, the inclusion of national personnel will facilitate a Congolese sense of ownership of 
the process, which is a key to renewing public faith in the justice system. Congolese staff would 
also provide crucial knowledge of the historical roots of the conflict. They will be able to inform 
the interaction of the chamber with their unique cultural context and will also bring expert 
knowledge of Congolese criminal law and legal procedure.91 Surprisingly, in the many reports 
calling for the establishment of a mixed chamber, there is practically no mention of gender parity 
on the chamber bench. While there may be a current shortage of female judges in the DRC, 
women could and certainly should be appointed from the international community. Given the 
gendered nature of many of the crimes that will be tried, gender composition on the bench is of 
central importance to the chamber’s success and it should be adequately addressed in the 
planning stage. The fact that it has not been emphasized thus far is cause for great concern and 
international political powers should take it upon themselves to urge the DRC government to 
address the issue head on. 
In its initial written comments on the Mapping Report, the DRC government responded 
to the possibility of creating a mixed chamber. They proposed it be situated within the Congolese 
judicial system but that it should have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes committed in the 
                                                
89 Ibid., para 904. 
90 Ibid., para 61. 
91 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, para 25. 
32
Undergraduate Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/undergradtjr/vol1/iss2/1
  21 
DRC.92 This means that the special chamber would be vested with the jurisdictional power to 
investigate and prosecute crimes of the nature of those documented in the Mapping Report. The 
burden of proof is a particularly onerous evidentiary standard in sexual violence cases. Beyond 
that, these crimes are difficult to prosecute. The perpetrators are often difficult to identify, and 
they may be powerful figures in rebel armies or holders of senior positions in national armed 
forces.93  Even more complex is proving guilt for a crime as a matter of command responsibility, 
rather than proving the guilt of those who committed a crime directly. Establishing links between 
acts on the ground and orders or acquiescence from above requires extensive experience on the 
part of the prosecution.94 However, proving command responsibility has been successful in other 
international tribunals, like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and therefore it should be treated as a realistic 
goal that should be undertaken in the Congolese context. 
Additional expertise is needed to ensure procedural fairness and the protection of 
witnesses and judicial staff from political interference. The presence and participation of 
international staff will also legitimize potential attempts to prosecute crimes allegedly committed 
by non-Congolese perpetrators. 95  Human Rights Watch urges that temporarily having 
international staff will give such a chamber the maximum credibility, judicial independence and 
                                                
92 Ibid.; Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Observations of the Government on the 
Report of the Mapping Exercise documenting the most serious violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
between March 2003 and June 2003, Unpublished, on file with Human Rights Watch (August 2010): 48.  
93 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 977.  
94 Ibid., 975. 
95 Ibid., 978. “Cooperation on extradition from certain States remains unlikely, given the few guarantees 
offered by the Congolese military courts in respect of fair and equitable trials and respect for the 
fundamental rights of defendants, particularly as the death penalty is still provided for under Congolese 
law.” 
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expertise required to handle crimes that are very complex and difficult to prosecute.96 The long- 
term hope is that the nationals represented in the chamber will gain the necessary expertise and 
that international participants will be gradually phased out.  
ii. Legal Foundation of the Mixed Chamber 
The mixed chamber can be enacted either by domestic law, as was done for the Bosnian War 
Crimes Chamber, or by a formal treaty between the DRC government and the UN. Article 149 of 
the Congolese Constitution allows for the creation of a specialized jurisdiction.97 For this reason, 
the enactment of a domestic law would be a good way to integrate the mixed chamber into the 
DRC judicial system. It is possible to create a mixed chamber in the DRC with the enactment of 
only one law. If the law were integrated into the current ICC/Rome Statute implementing 
legislation mentioned above, Parliament’s passing of this legislation would also mean the 
passing of the mixed chamber creation law. A less efficient yet still effective alternative would 
be to enact a separate law that would create the mixed chamber. If it were set up under 
Congolese law, this would still emphasize domestic ownership of the court and would not 
require formal UN involvement. If neither of these options is chosen, memoranda of 
understanding could be signed by partners who will assist with the chamber’s establishment, 
funding and support of its functioning.98 This method would not emphasize domestic ownership, 
but it would still succeed in creating the mixed chamber. Alternatively, a mixed chamber could 
also be created by a formal agreement between the UN and the DRC government.  
                                                
96 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, para 25. 
97 “La loi peut créer des juridictions spécialisées.” Constitution de la République démocratique du Congo, 
Kinshasa, Feb 18, 2006, Article 149. 
98 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, para 25. The UN, the African Union or the European Union would be 
potential partners under this method.   
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According to both internationally accepted standards and the Congolese constitution, a 
mixed chamber of this nature should be based in the civilian justice system, rather than outside 
of it. It is not yet clear where in the civilian court system the mixed chamber would actually be 
located. Human Rights Watch believes it could, and probably should, have what is referred to as 
a “mobile” function.99 This would provide the court with one permanent location, but would 
enable it to hold some proceedings closer to where the crimes were committed. Where a specific 
region suffered particularly brutal or numerous attacks, use of the mixed chamber’s mobile 
function could emphasize Congolese ownership of the process. It may also enable victim-
witnesses to testify in court who otherwise would not be able to travel to the permanent location. 
Victim-witness testimony is fundamental to the post-conflict judicial process and should be 
encouraged as much as possible.  
Ideally, the policy-makers for the chamber should consult civil society regarding the 
temporal jurisdiction vested in the chamber.100 An ideal, though broad, jurisdiction would allow 
prosecution for crimes from March 1993 onward, which includes the period covered by the 
Mapping Report. This overcomes the temporal jurisdiction restraints on the ICC, which was 
created in 2002. It is essential that the temporal jurisdiction be left open-ended because serious 
international offences that would fall under the mixed chambers legal jurisdiction continue 
today. The mixed chamber should be given primary, but not sole, jurisdiction over cases that 
involve war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.  
iii. Mandate, Targets and Composition of the Mixed Chamber 
The primary focus of the mixed chamber should be those “persons most responsible” for 
committing war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Depending on the severity of the 
                                                
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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crime or its scale, this refers particularly to those in political or military leadership and those 
down the chain of command who may be found “most responsible.” 101  As an overall 
prosecutorial method, this would also facilitate the trying of lower-ranking officials who are 
suspected of committing particularly heinous crimes like GBSV crimes, especially those 
committed against a large number of victims. It is essential that the mixed chamber be set up to 
best prevent political interference and to promote efficiency. There are three key ingredients to 
ensuring this: it will need its own mixed bench of judges, its own investigation and prosecution 
teams and its own administrative structure or “registry.” 102 The registry deserves special 
attention. It would handle administrative functions that relate to the chambers operation, like the 
recruitment of staff, finances, security, management of evidence, documentation for trial, 
translations, and detention facilities. More importantly, the registry would also serve to promote 
procedural fairness for those being tried, as well as the wellbeing and protection of victims and 
witnesses. This would include facilitating the role of the defense, victims’ lawyers, managing 
witness protection, and the essential outreach to local population about trials.  
Outreach is instrumental to both Congolese ownership of the process and to ensuring that 
victim-witnesses come forward to testify. An outreach to the local population is especially 
important for victims of sexual violence. The heavy stigma placed on survivors of those crimes 
has acted in the past as a strong deterrent against reporting. In the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber, 
a weak outreach program called the Court Support Network has made little progress in 
promoting the work of the court to those in the communities most affected by the crimes being 
tried. This area will need to be dramatically improved upon in the Congo. Much of the violence, 
                                                
101 United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, UN Doc S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, para 30, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/ 
GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement. 
102 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, para 25. 
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including the brutal sexual violence, was carried out as retaliation or punishment for supporting 
opposing political groups or military factions. Therefore, in order to encourage victim-witnesses 
to come forward to report the crimes and testify against their aggressors, they must trust that the 
system will prosecute the perpetrators effectively and efficiently and that they will be protected 
from further violence carried out as a result of their testimony. Sexual violence crimes are 
particularly complicated to prosecute, especially since they are so numerous in the DRC. The 
mixed chamber will have to actively promote accountability for these types of crimes, which will 
likely mean the inclusion of additional expertise in the mixed chamber in this area of law.103 
For this purpose, Human Rights Watch has proposed the creation of a “specialized sexual 
violence unit” in the mixed chamber that will attempt to assign responsibility for these crimes 
and provide expertise in their prosecution.104 This unit should also provide advice and training to 
other chamber staff to prepare them to interview victims appropriately and to handle sensitively 
the victims of sexual violence.105 Additionally, creating an option for closed sessions is likely to 
be a useful function of the mixed chamber. The Bosnia War Crimes Chamber uses this option, 
notably to protect a witness testifying under unusually dangerous circumstances.106 This should 
be written into the creation legislation in order to accommodate witnesses or witness-victims 
who may be risking their safety in order to testify against individuals in powerful positions.107 
VI. Essential Aid for Victims of Sexual Violence  
                                                
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 This interview training will also be essential to addressing the special case of former child solders. 
106 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Criminal Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Official Gazette of BiH, no. 36/2003, December 21, 2003, Article 235, 
www.legislationline.org/.../Criminal_Procedure_Code_of_BH_-_consolidated_version_dec2009.pdf.  
107 Bogdan Ivanišević, “The War Crimes Chamber in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From Hybrid to Domestic 
Court,” International Center for Transitional Justice (2008): 15, 
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/1/0/1088.pdf. 
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“In the post-war transition period, the promotion of women’s human rights and gender equality 
is not seen as a priority, in particular in efforts to address the consequences of the armed conflict 
and in the peace building and reconstruction processes.”108 The Mapping Report makes it clear 
that the special traumas suffered by women and children must be explicitly addressed in the 
peace-building process. The gendered aspect of these crimes needs to be adequately addressed in 
the Congolese public. “Sexual violence in armed conflicts in the DRC is fuelled by gender-based 
discrimination in the society at large.”109 Customary laws regulate 75% of the law for the 60% of 
the Congolese population living in rural areas.110 This means that the law protects traditions 
governing the interaction between men and women and thus it enforces the rights of women as 
less than those of men. The rights of Congolese women and girls are generally subordinated to 
the honour of their husband, family and community. This attaches additional significance to their 
coming forward and denouncing rape, for which they may be abandoned or re-victimized by 
their community. Tragically, when a Congolese woman reports a rape, she may be putting her 
marriage at risk or seriously jeopardize her chances of ever getting married. Women are often 
cast out after falling victim to sexual violence and, as shelter and refuge options for these women 
and children are insufficient to meet the vast demand, they are exposed to the serious risks of 
violence in the street.111 This is one reason why many Congolese women and children end up 
working in prostitution. There is a serious lack of resources in aid for sexual violence victims. 
There have been many grassroots attempts to help women recover from the trauma of rape, such 
                                                
108 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Mapping Exercise, para 653. 
109 Ibid., para 533. 
110 Dunia Zongwe, François Butedi and Phebe Mavungu Clément, UPDATE: The Legal System and 
Research of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): An Overview, Hauser Global Law School 
Program, New York University School of Law (August/September 2010), 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/democratic_republic_congo1.htm. 
111 Bosmans, “Challenges in Aid to Rape Victims: The Case of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo,”10. 
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as centers set up by Congolese women to help one another. However, on a broader scale, 
providing some initial assistance tends to come at the expense of an almost total lack of long-
term follow-up care for the victims, their family and their community. Frequently, programs for 
victims of GBSV stop once they are able to return to their home, despite the difficulties they will 
face upon rejoining their community. It is rarely acknowledged that, “problems of cohabiting 
with the family and the community may arise only after some months, or even after some years, 
as the effects of the trauma start to emerge.”112 
Bringing perpetrators to justice is crucial to Congolese ownership of the judicial process 
and of moving forward. The creation of a mixed chamber can help to address the complex post-
conflict problems faced by many Congolese civilians. There is now a generation of Congolese 
children who have only known conflict and who have been raised in an environment where the 
violent and senseless rape of women was a perverse reality. Comprehensive social work is 
needed to combat subsequent views of rape as normal. More than that, something needs to be 
done to help the estimated tens of thousands of Congolese people who have fallen victim to these 
types of attacks. Validating these crimes as war crimes, rather than as a side effect of war, is 
essential to this process. Also fundamental to peace-building is the improvement of the situation 
of women, which can be encouraged by increasing their visibility in the prosecution and peace-
building processes.  
“Preventing rape and sexual violence not only includes fighting impunity, but also 
includes eliminating socio-cultural barriers that enhance the ‘acceptability’ of sexual violence 
perpetrated by non-combatants.”113 If changes to the structure of the DRC judicial process are to 
be expected to end the impunity toward these crimes, there must also be a change in the beliefs 
                                                
112 Ibid. 
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and opinions of many Congolese, especially those in the judiciary. Culture and tradition are 
frequently invoked to protect the practice of rape, coerced sex and the sexual abuse of minors.114 
Given the general political and social devastation of the DRC over the past few decades, 
international financial aid will be required for there to be a meaningful rebuilding process. It is 
essential that the interests of the aid programs, whether they are national, international, 
governmental or NGOs, not be treated as paramount to the interests of those they are seeking to 
help. A non-comprehensive approach to sexual violence, whereby attention is given to only one 
or two aspects of aid and prevention, will inevitably mean that the rights of the rape victims are 
not fully respected, and may even increase the risk of other forms of sexual violence. Limited 
resources will require extremely efficient and effective use. In the Essex Human Rights Review, 
Marleen Bosmans recommends that coordinating mechanisms be set up to improve and enhance 
the use of resources in these interventions. “Building a national and local capacity to respond 
properly to the needs of rape victims and to support advocacy on the broader issue of sexual and 
gender-based violence will be paramount for the promotion and realization of gender equality in 
the post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo.”115 This type of program will be very useful in 
building a durable Congolese infrastructure and should be given extensive consideration. 
It is not under dispute that in accordance with human rights and humanitarian law 
standards, women and children should be given special protection from rape and sexual violence. 
Additionally, most experts agree that access to adequate aid is as essential as protection. 
Prevention plays an invaluable role in this process because a rights-based approach for women 
and children should not only treat victims, but should work to prevent the future victimization of 
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women and children.116 In the DRC, victims of sexual violence are in serious need of medical 
and clinical aid, psychological and psychosocial support, legal aid, economic assistance, 
protection, and security. To fulfill their medical needs, there must be adequate quality treatment 
of their physical injuries, including specialized surgical interventions for physical trauma such as 
fistulas. Since abortion is illegal in the DRC, victims are also in serious need of emergency 
contraceptives and pregnancy care. High rates of sexually transmitted infections, including 
HIV/AIDS, means victims must have access to antibiotics, post-exposure prophylaxis, and 
voluntary counseling. As well, HIV testing and anti-retroviral treatments must be accessible to 
victims.117 These types of post-rape measures are not normally offered in the DRC, which puts 
victims at a greater risk of unwanted pregnancy and debilitating or life-threatening illness. In 
terms of psychosocial resources, the serious traumas suffered by victims create the additional 
need for long-term, accessible psychosocial support. Counselors and group therapy should be 
made available to victims in order to help them cope with their trauma. This type of treatment 
will also play a role in preparing victims for life outside the shelter or hospital where they are 
being treated. Further, since victims of sexual violence often face abandonment by their 
husbands and family, they will need economic support to enable them to survive without family 
and to provide for their children. Shelter is essential to this process, as women and children will 
need protection from the reprisals frequently endured by survivors of previous sexual assaults, 
especially those who report their attack.118 Ideally, economic aid will also be available to help 
victims travel to court and testify against their aggressors. These programs are desperately 
needed, but they are a great deal to demand of a country with such limited resources, which is 
precisely why international support is essential. 
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i. Increased Presence of Women in the Public Sphere 
Currently, there is an obvious shortage of judges and prosecutors in the DRC. “The DRC, with 
its population of some 60 million, has around 1500 civil and military magistrates.”119 There are 
not nearly enough trained professionals to carry out the legal work that needs to be done.120 In 
addition to the inadequate number of legal professionals, there is a severe gender imbalance in 
the field, which results in a scarcity of women at all levels of the administration of justice.121 
Gender disparity in this particular profession is not in any way isolated to the region, but the 
nature of sexual violence suggests that victims are likely to be more reluctant to speak of their 
experiences before male policemen, prosecutors and magistrates. The gender parity project 
l’Observatoire de la parité surveyed 929 military and civil judges and prosecutors across all ten 
Congolese provinces, except Kinshasa. They found 34, or around 3.5% of these professionals 
were women.122 The DRC GBSV delegation of the Swedish Foundation for Human Rights 
reports that regional NGOs were of the opinion that “this male predominance in the judiciary 
contributed to the ‘banalisation’ of sexual violence and sexual offences generally as a ‘woman’s 
affair’ or again as a matter for the international community, if it wanted to interest itself in it.”123 
As a result of this attitude, evidence of sexual violence is not being treated seriously. 
The status of Congolese women can be improved in part by increasing their visibility in 
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Democratic Republic of Congo, para 35. 
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122 Global Rights, S.O.S. Justice – What justice is there for vulnerable groups in Eastern DRC? August 
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http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR62/018/2004/en/63b10028-d57f-11dd-bb24-
1fb85fe8fa05/afr620182004en.html.  
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the transitional justice and peace-building processes. While training Congolese women to be 
prosecutors and judges should remain a long-term goal, the process of increased visibility can 
begin with basic training and education. This will enable them to secure positions at the 
administrative level of the justice system. For instance, upon the establishment of the mixed 
chamber, there will be many job positions to fill and potential employees will need training in 
the procedures of that court. Congolese women are viable candidates for this type of work and 
the chamber should take great pains to ensure that 50% of mixed chamber registry employees are 
women (whether the work is administrative, investigative, procedural or otherwise). Given that 
these are not decision-making positions, institutional bias due to their experience of the conflict 
is unlikely to be an issue. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The conflict is ongoing in the DRC. Recent events have demonstrated that women and children 
are suffering the same terrors of sexual violence as they were 14 years ago when the First Congo 
War began. While the peace-building process must end the fighting, particularly in the eastern 
provinces, aid and assistance are desperately needed for civilians who have no justice system to 
protect them. The widespread impunity for violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law has led to the normalization of sexual violence in conflict. This epidemic of 
GBSV has made life in the DRC very difficult, especially for women and children. The UN 
Mapping Report recommends the creation of a mixed chamber domestic court to try cases of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in accordance with the definition of these crimes 
and crimes of sexual violence found in the Rome Statute. This is highly significant, as years of 
impunity have eroded both the justice system and public faith in its ability to serve Congolese 
citizens. As an important starting point, there must be an end to impunity and a disposal of 
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arcane, yet predominant ideas of rape as a women’s issue that is secondary to armed conflict. 
This is an essential step toward peace in the DRC, but the problems faced by civilian populations 
are too diverse and complex for a court to address adequately. Victims of sexual violence need 
access to medical and psychosocial care. This requires an organization like a “specialized sexual 
violence unit,” which can facilitate expertise in prosecution.124 Conceivably, a unit of this nature 
could also provide emergency contraceptives, pregnancy care, HIV/AIDS testing, antibiotics, 
post-exposure prophylaxis and surgical attention for serious injuries like fistulas. In terms of the 
psychological aid, the programs have to be long-term, as the trauma of these attacks can often 
only surface after several months or even years. There must also be shelter for women and 
children who are abandoned by their families after rape. Economic aid is badly needed. Each of 
these programs will improve the judicial goals set by the mixed chamber by helping women to 
come forward and travel to courts to testify. Beyond all aid, there must be social work to change 
Congolese traditional views of women as subordinate to men. This can be improved on through 
the increased visibility of women in the public sphere. The process will not be easy, but by 
placing women in public positions, such as the mixed chamber registry, and by helping them to 
be healthy and to feel safe, there is a chance that the DRC of the future will see a peaceful end to 
widespread sexual violence and the perpetrators of these crimes brought to justice. 
 
KEY ACRONYMS USED 
 
• ADF/NALU  Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda 
  (made up of former Ugandan rebel groups, the ADF/NALU appeared in 
  the second half of the 80s after Yoweri Museveni seized power in Uganda) 
• AFDL   Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo 
• ALC   Armée de Libération du Congo (armed wing of the MLC) 
• ALiR   Armée de Libération du Rwanda (movement formed in 1998 comprising  
                                                
124 The Swedish Foundation for Human Rights, Justice, Impunity, and Sexual Violence in Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo, para 25. 
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the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and armed Hutu elements) 
• ANC  Armée Nationale Congolaise (armed wing of the RCD-Goma) 
• ANR   Agence Nationale de Renseignements 
• APC   Armée du Peuple Congolais (armed wing of the RCD-ML) 
• APR   Armée Patriotique Rwandaise (national army of Rwanda from 1994 to 
  2002) 
• CAAFAG  Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups (male  
CAAFAGs are commonly referred to as Kadogo, “little ones” in DRC 
colloquial Swahili.)  
• CNDD  Burundian Hutu Movement 
• FAC   Forces Armées Congolaises (national army of the DRC from June 1997) 
• FAR  National army of Rwanda before July 1994. 
• FAZ   Forces Armées Zaïroises (national army of Zaire) 
• FDD  Armed wing of CNDD 
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THE LEGACY OF INEQUITY: 
AN ANALYSIS OF JOHANNESBURG AND CAPE TOWN IN POST-APARTHEID 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Jory Hennick 
 
 
Academics of urban studies have questioned what legacies linger from the South African 
Apartheid system, what reforms were introduced and whether or not they were effective in 
overcoming those resulting challenges. This analysis will contend that the goal of adopting a 
democratic, non-racial state in post-Apartheid South Africa was challenged predominantly by 
the legacy of inequity, which affected all aspects of society - economic, political and social. By 
comparing the two most prominent cities in South Africa, Johannesburg and Cape Town, it will 
become evident that while similar political reforms were introduced in both cities, each 
implemented distinct economic development reforms and initiatives to address the issue of 
widespread disparities in the transition towards a democratic, non-discriminatory state. Finally, 
this examination will offer suggestions on how South African cities can overcome further 
political and economic inequities to ensure a democratic, non-racial state in the future. 
 
In the mid-20th century, the election of the National Party resulted in the segregation of South 
African cities and the beginning of Apartheid. Apartheid refers to the structure of legal racial 
segregation imposed by the national government of South Africa from 1948 to 1994. During this 
period, the majority non-whites held no rights while the minority whites maintained control 
within South African cities. Apartheid in South Africa was declared officially over with the 1994 
elections and the national government’s aim to establish a democratic, non-racial state. 
Academics of urban studies have questioned what legacies linger from the Apartheid system, 
what reforms were introduced and whether or not they were effective in overcoming those 
resulting challenges. The following analysis will contend that the goal of adopting a democratic, 
non-racial state in post-Apartheid South Africa was challenged predominantly by the legacy of 
inequity, which affected all aspects of society- economic, political and social. By comparing the 
two most prominent cities in South Africa, Johannesburg and Cape Town, it will become evident 
that while similar political reforms were introduced in both cities, each implemented distinct 
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economic development reforms and initiatives to address the issue of widespread disparities in 
the transition towards a democratic, non-discriminatory state. Finally, this examination will offer 
suggestions on how South African cities can overcome further political and economic inequities 
to ensure a democratic, non-racial state in the future. 
Prior to examining how local governments in South African cities sought to resolve the 
Apartheid legacy of inequity, one must first review and understand the historical circumstances 
and conditions during Apartheid in South Africa. From 1980 until the official end of Apartheid 
in 1994, the circumstances in South Africa were adverse. Low-density, high-income white 
neighbourhoods were established near and within the urban centres, whereas large and 
impoverished, high-density suburbs were established in the urban periphery for non-whites. As a 
result of physical and social segregation in South African cities, African townships were poorly 
serviced and were primarily informal settlements.1 These informal settlements were located just 
outside urban centres and consisted primarily of dwellings made of scrap metal, wood, and plastic. Until 
the 1980s, the non-white majority was only permitted entrance to the city to service the mines 
and industries owned by the white population.2 Furthermore, many restrictions were placed on 
non-white businesses in those segregated townships.3 Consequently, the growth rate of South 
Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP) was very low at a mere 1.6 percent per annum.4 
Employment in South African’s primary industries was declining. In the mining industry, for 
example, employment decreased from 24 percent to 16 percent.5 Along with the slow economic 
                                                
1 Richard Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan 
Government in Johannesburg,” Urban Forum 10, no.1 (1999): 5. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw, and Susan Parnell, “Local Government, Poverty Reduction and  
Inequality in Johannesburg,” Environment & Urbanization 12, no.1 (2000): 3. 
5 Ibid., 4. 
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growth and increasing unemployment rate, population growth was increasingly rapidly.6 As a 
result, unemployment in the South African Gauteng province alone reached roughly 30 percent.7 
Population growth of 1.7 percent surpassed employment growth of 1.5 percent,8 resulting in 
widespread unemployment and poverty. In the early 1990s, 50 percent of the South African 
population held 11 percent of the national income.9 The equity division between whites and non-
whites during Apartheid was rapidly becoming the most prevalent issue in the municipalities. 
The beginning of the end of Apartheid started in the 1980s with the introduction of the 
Black Local Authorities (BLAs), responsible for governing black townships in the urban areas.10 
The BLAs received no funding from provincial or national governments and thus were required 
to collect rent and service payments to financially manage their respective townships. 11 
However, the BLAs’ revenue collection was never adequate to effectively govern the 
townships.12 This resulted in the Soweto Rent Boycotts, when 80 percent of the population from 
the black township of Soweto responded through riots and protests to the deteriorating living and 
economic conditions.13 This social movement is a prime example of the ‘Political Opportunity 
Structure’ theory, which claims that peoples’ social behavior depends primarily on their 
opportunities for political participation.14 In the Soweto Township case, possibilities for the poor 
to participate were limited15, which led them to rise up to retain political opportunities.  
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ben Cashdan, “Local Government and Poverty in South Africa,” in Democratizing local government: the South 
African experiment, ed. Susan Parnell, Edgar Pieterse, Mark Swilling, and Dominique Wooldridge (Cape Town: Juta 
and Company Ltd., 2007): 160. 
10Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan Government in Johannesburg,” 
7. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 Christopher Rootes, “Political Opportunity Structures: Promise, Problems and Prospects,” La Lettre de la Maison 
Française d’Oxford 10 (1999): 75. 
15 Ibid. 
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These boycotts sparked nation-wide opposition to the Apartheid structure and, 
consequently, “One City, One Tax Base” became an eminent motto across all South African 
cities.16 The national government soon discovered that the existing structure in South Africa was 
unstable and that remedies to Apartheid were necessary. This marked a turning point in South 
African history as the national government in South Africa promised to transform the Apartheid 
system.17 It committed itself to a “non-racial and democratic structure of local government and 
improved quality of life by establishing a common tax base and upgrading services.”18 The 
Apartheid system was officially renounced in 1994 with the election of new local governments. 
Nevertheless, declaring the end of the Apartheid system in 1994 was not in itself the major 
challenge for South Africa. Rather, while the national government had promised to put an end to 
the Apartheid structure, South African cities faced major challenges that needed to be addressed 
in order to completely eliminate it. The Apartheid structure left the key legacy of inequity, 
defined as a lack of fairness or impartiality.19 This legacy of Apartheid left the citizens of South 
Africa disproportionately represented in all facets of society, primarily politically and 
economically. Addressing the issue of civic inequity in South African cities represented the 
major impediment to achieving a non-racial, democratic system throughout the country.20 
                                                
16 Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan Government in Johannesburg,” 
8. 
17 Brij Maharaj, “The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid Transformation in South Africa: 
The Case of Durban,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 15, no.2 (1997): 264. 
18 Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan Government in Johannesburg,” 
8. 
 
19 Dictionary.reference.com, s.v. “Inequity,” accessed November 28, 2010, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/inequity. 
20 David Schmidt, “From Spheres to Tiers - Conceptions of Local Government in South Africa in the Period of 
1994-2006,” in Consolidating developmental local government: lessons from the South African experience, ed. 
Mirjam Von Donk, Susan Parnell, Edgar Pieterse, and Mark Swilling (Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd., 2008): 
118. 
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Resolving this issue became the driving force behind the transformation of local government in 
the post-Apartheid system.21 
For local government transformation to take place, certain political and economic reforms 
were introduced and adopted in South African municipalities to resolve the issue of inequity. It is 
important to note that local governments were by no means functioning alone in this process of 
re-structuring after Apartheid. The national government was also involved in these processes and 
the two levels of government worked in consort with one another. While political and economic 
reforms were set forth at the national level to resolve inequity, local governments were the 
primary force responsible for implementing and enforcing these reforms. This analysis will first 
examine these local political reforms, focusing primarily on the cases of Johannesburg and Cape 
Town. 
During Apartheid, the majority non-whites’ political rights were heavily restricted and thus 
not effectively represented in local government. As a result, re-conceptualizing the municipal 
government politically by reallocating resources and political powers towards the poor was 
crucial to resolving issues of inequity in South African cities. Since white local authorities lacked 
the motivation to establish integration and a non-racial government in an attempt to maintain the 
status quo, the national government was responsible for outlining the mandatory changes in 
political structures of local government to help overcome political inequity. Political reforms 
were introduced to ensure a democratic system whereby all citizens were equally represented in 
government. Many political reforms were introduced by the national government in the early 
1990s to pave the way for the official end of Apartheid in the 1994 elections. All municipal-level 
                                                
21 Ibid. 
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governments throughout South Africa, including Johannesburg and Cape Town, implemented the 
same political reforms across the board.22 
In 1993, the national government mapped out the Local Government Transition Act 
(LGTA).23 The LGTA aimed to create a guided transition towards a democratic structure of local 
government and provide measures for overcoming racially based local government structures 
and inequalities. 24  The LGTA outlined several phases of local government structural 
transformations that were implemented from the early 1990s (prior to the official declaration of 
the end of Apartheid) until a fully democratic system was installed in local governments. 
Beginning with the ‘negotiations and forums’ phase, local governments were required to put in 
place forums that would negotiate and drive the transition from the Apartheid system in South 
Africa.25 Second, during the ‘pre-interim’ stage, legislation and local councils were appointed 
through the use of a 50/50 formula.26 During the third, ‘interim’ phase, which occurred after the 
first democratic elections in 1994, the local constitution would be written.27 The ‘final phase’ 
proclaimed the beginning of a fully democratic council with a newly negotiated constitution.28 
This process sought to gradually transition local governments towards democratic structures of 
government and the resolution of inequities. 
The cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town were prime examples of how every local 
government in South Africa adopted the same political reforms introduced by the national 
                                                
22 Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan Government in Johannesburg,” 
1. 
23 Ibid., 2. 
24 Maharaj, “The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid Transformation in South Africa: The 
Case of Durban,” 268. 
25 Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan Government in Johannesburg,” 
2. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Maharaj, “The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid Transformation in South Africa: The 
Case of Durban,” 268. 
28 Ibid., 9. 
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governments. Both Cape Town and Johannesburg introduced Local Government Negotiating 
Forums29 in 1993, as part of the ‘negotiations and forums’ phase. These forums could be found 
in every urban centre in South Africa in the early 1990s. The Cape Town Metropolitan 
Negotiation Forum (CMNF)30 and the Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Negotiating Forum 
(GJMNF) were responsible for governing their respective cities until local government elections 
in 1994.31 The forums managed the ‘interim’ transition towards a democratic system in South 
Africa. They negotiated the dissolution of racially based authorities in cities; discussed 
boundaries and appointed non-racial councils with political control over administrative and 
financial resources; and further sought to address the backlog of the provision of services to 
citizens.32 Essentially, these forums, through the adoption of the 50/50 formula explained below, 
were necessary to ensure that issues of inequity would be overcome and that the interests of all 
South African citizens would be taken into account. 
In order to resolve inequity and create a non-racial democratic state, the third ‘interim’ 
phase involved reorganizing the political structures in Johannesburg and Cape Town. The 
national government enforced what has become known as the 50/50 formula.33 Half of the 
interim council was comprised of existing statutory groups, while the other half contained non-
statutory bodies such as the African National Congress (primarily a non-white political party), 
the BLAs, and other organizations.34 Forums were organized using the 50/50 formula for two 
reasons: as an attempt to unite the majority non-whites and minority whites, and also to divide 
                                                
29 Ibid., 7. 
30 Robert Cameron, “Megacities in South Africa: A Solution for the New Millennium?” Public Administration and 
Development 20 (2000): 157. 
31 Tomlinson, “Ten Years in the Making: A History of the Evolution of Metropolitan Government in Johannesburg,” 
2. 
32 Maharaj, “The Politics of Local Government Restructuring and Apartheid Transformation in South Africa: The 
Case of Durban,” 265. 
33 Ibid., 274. 
34 Ibid. 
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power so as to equally represent all citizens.35 Through this formula and the negotiating forums, 
all South African citizens were guaranteed equal rights and representation. These structural 
reforms were not only introduced in Cape Town and Johannesburg, but throughout all South 
African cities.36  
After the national elections of December 1, 1994, the forums evolved into metropolitan 
councils as part of both the ‘interim’ and ‘final’ stages of the LGTA. These councils, such as the 
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council (GJMC) and the Cape Town Metropolitan Council 
(CMC)37 were vested with the responsibility of governing South African cities. This government 
restructuring and the reforms that were introduced created city councils that no longer 
discriminated based on race and ensured that all South African citizens maintained equal rights. 
The mandatory negotiations, forums and the 50/50 formula initiated by the national government 
in the LGTA helped South Africa overcome political inequity. Applying identical political 
reforms in Cape Town and Johannesburg, as well as in all other South African cities, was crucial 
to ensuring equal representation of all South African citizens and providing legitimacy to the 
democratic system through political consistency. Essentially, this marked the transition to a fully 
democratic, non-racial system in post-Apartheid South Africa.  
Resolving the legacy of political inequity was clearly a fundamental challenge for South 
African cities in the post-Apartheid transition. As with the political reforms, the national 
government was also responsible for introducing economic development reforms to help resolve 
economic inequity in the post-Apartheid system. Once again, local governments were 
responsible for driving the process of economic development through the implementation of 
these reforms. Yet, while Johannesburg and Cape Town undertook identical political reforms to 
                                                
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Cameron, “Megacities in South Africa: A Solution for the New Millennium?” 157. 
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reform their municipal governments, these two cities adopted different economic development 
strategies and reforms. 
Improving economic conditions in the post-Apartheid period faced several challenges as a 
result of extensive disparities. Widespread poverty remained a predominant issue in the mid-
1990s. For further perspective, Randburg, the wealthiest white township of Johannesburg, 
boasted an average yearly income of R 52,927 in 1994.38 Soweto, on the other hand, the 
wealthiest black township, had an average income of only R 8,358. 39  During this time, 
approximately 40 percent of households in South Africa earned less then R 1,500 per month.40 
Unemployment, which reached approximately 34 percent, continued to remain an issue. African 
townships were threatened by service backlogs: 20 percent of all urban households were without 
electricity and 25 percent had no access to water.41 Clearly, poverty alleviation and economic 
development needed to be addressed in order to resolve the legacy of inequity in the post-
Apartheid system.42 
In 1998, the South African national government, through the Ministry of Provisional 
Affairs and Constitutional Development, introduced the White Paper on Local Government.43 
The White Paper focused on economic and social development through participation and 
partnership.44 Its main emphasis was on the concept of developmental local government.45 This 
                                                
38 Cashdan, “Local Government and Poverty in South Africa,” 161. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid., 160. 
41 Ibid., 161. 
42 Ibid., 160. 
43 Schmidt, “From Spheres to Tiers - Conceptions of Local Government in South Africa in the Period of 1994-
2006,” 112. 
44 South Africa, White Paper Working Committee, The White Paper on Local Government (Pretoria: National 
Government of South Africa, [1998]), http://www.thedplg.gov.za/subwebsites/wpaper/ 
wpindex.htm. 
45 Ibid. 
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concept, also known as the ‘networked governance’ approach46, emerged in the 1990s to address 
the limitations of the state and challenges facing society during the transition in South Africa. It 
sought to integrate the divided cities by aligning relationships and creating networks of planning, 
viewing development as an essential process that takes place through engaging citizens and 
groups.47 Under this approach, partnership with civil society, co-innovation and civic leadership 
became vehicles for change.48 This analysis will show that while Johannesburg and Cape Town 
agreed with the national government’s White Paper on economic development, they adopted 
their own distinct approaches to meet the distinct economic development needs of their cities. 
Cape Town adopted what has become known as the ‘tiers’ approach, a top-down 
hierarchical strategy of economic development.49 For the most part, Cape Town’s municipal 
government remained suspicious of partnerships with local stakeholders. As a result, their ‘tiers’ 
approach focused on centralized organization of economic development.50 The Cape Town local 
government maintained a strong infrastructural emphasis on delivery and provision of services to 
the poor to achieve equity.51 Essentially, the Cape Town municipal government adopted the 
strategy of redistributing equity and services by directly targeting South African citizens. For 
instance, the most significant local government project in Cape Town was known as the N2 
Gateway Housing Pilot Project.52 This project was the primary focus of the Cape Town 
municipal government and sought to deliver affordable and sustainable housing to eliminate 
                                                
46 Schmidt, “From Spheres to Tiers - Conceptions of Local Government in South Africa in the Period of 1994-
2006,” 112. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., 124. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Catherine Cross, “Local Governance and Social Conflict: Implications for Piloting South Africa's New Housing 
Plan in Cape Town's Informal Settlements,” in Informal Settlements: A Perpetual Challenge, ed. Marie 
Huchzermeyer and Aly Karam (Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd., 2006): 252. 
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informal settlements by 2014.53 Hence, “This City Works for You” became Cape Town’s maxim 
as the government directly targeted the citizens, rather than working alongside stakeholders to 
co-deliver equity.54 
On the other hand, Johannesburg attempted to move beyond the ‘tiers’ strategy towards 
what became known as the ‘spheres’ approach to resolving economic inequity.55 This was a 
more decentralized approach to developmental local government.56 The Johannesburg local 
government emphasized the use of partnerships and entities, such as the Johannesburg 
Development Agency (JDA), to drive the development agenda.57 By doing so, the Johannesburg 
Metropolitan Council believed that regenerating the city through interventions and social 
participation, rather than directly targeting citizens, would resolve the issue of inequity and lead 
to economic growth. 58  Inner City Regeneration Strategies became the focal point of the 
Johannesburg local government’s development initiatives.  
One of the entities introduced by the Johannesburg municipal government was the 
Johannesburg Inner City Business Coalition (JICBC).59 This was a large group of businesses, 
corporations and property owners, working in consort with local government, which were 
committed to urban renewal.60 City Improvement Districts (CIDS) were created, whereby 
businesses within decaying districts could contribute to the rehabilitation of these troubled 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 Schmidt, “From Spheres to Tiers - Conceptions of Local Government in South African in the Period of 1994-
2006,” 124. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Johannesburg Inner City Business Coalition, “About the JICBC,” 2010, http://www.joburgcentral.co.za/about.php 
(accessed November 24, 2010). 
60 Ibid.  
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areas.61 Since 2006, the JICBC has contributed approximately 4 billion Rand in development and 
rehabilitation funds for the inner city. 62  These contributions were applied to developing 
reasonably priced residential and commercial projects, funding local schools and improving 
entertainment and retail areas. In fact, the GJMC created the Urban Renewal Tax Credit to 
motivate businesses to become involved in urban regeneration. 63  This tax credit offers 
opportunities for corporations to invest in refurbishing residential and commercial buildings in 
designated decaying inner city areas. The government has even offered to write-off bad debts 
incurred by property owners to encourage reconstruction of these decaying buildings. 
Academics of urban studies have questioned why Johannesburg and Cape Town adopted 
divergent economic development strategies to address economic inequity. Municipal 
governments felt they had to implement an economic strategy that would best succeed and 
complement their city’s desires. In Cape Town, the city council utilized the ‘tiers’ paradigm 
because it was suspicious of local participation and stakeholders’ lack of political stability. They 
were concerned that teaming up with social groups and organizations to contribute to 
development could result in corruption.64 Thus, the CMC believed that directly targeting citizens 
was the most effective approach to development. The Johannesburg Metropolitan Council, in 
contrast, believed that the decentralized ‘spheres’ approach satisfied their main agenda for 
                                                
61 “Private Sector Investment in the Johannesburg Inner City,” WhatsOnSA Online Arts Magazine, 
http://whatsonsa.co.za/news/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=99:private-sector-investment-
johannesburg-inner-city (accessed October 15, 2010). 
62 Ibid. 
63 South Africa, National Treasury, Urban Renewal Tax Incentive Launched in Johannesburg and Cape Town 
(Johannesburg: National Treasury of South Africa, [2004]), http://www.treasury.gov.za/ 
comm_media/press/2004/2004101401.pdf.  
64 Schmidt, “From Spheres to Tiers - Conceptions of Local Government in South African in the Period of 1994-
2006,” 124. 
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economic growth.65 This approach fulfilled the Council’s desire to establish itself as the 
economic hub of Africa and become a “World Class City”. 
Statistics have illustrated that both the Johannesburg and Cape Town strategies succeeded, 
but in different ways. Cape Town was more successful in delivering services to the poor than 
Johannesburg due to its direct targeting of residents. Sanitation in Cape Town had improved by 
92 percent by 2004, while Johannesburg’s improved by only 40 percent in the same period.66 By 
this time, only 2 percent of Cape Town households lacked electricity, whereas 6 percent of 
Johannesburg households had no electricity.67 Finally, statistics showed that households’ access 
to water was 85 percent in Cape Town and only 62 percent in Johannesburg.68  However, while 
Cape Town surpassed Johannesburg in delivering basic services to its citizens, Johannesburg 
outperformed Cape Town in economic growth. For instance, in Johannesburg, employment 
growth reached 2.5 percent per annum whereas Cape Town’s reached only 1.6 percent.69 
Moreover, Johannesburg’s GDP per capita was 5.3 percent higher than any other South African 
city, while Cape Town’s GDP per capita was the lowest of any South African city.70   
Evidently, the national government White Paper of 1998 forced municipal governments to 
adopt economic development initiatives to resolve economic inequity in South African cities. 
But this analysis has demonstrated that, while local municipalities handled political reforms 
similarly, economic reforms diverged. Both Johannesburg and Cape Town succeeded in 
fostering degrees of economic equality, but did so in ways that complemented their cities desired 
goals; this resulted in somewhat different development outcomes. One may suggest that despite 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., 125. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid., 126. 
70 Ibid. 
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Johannesburg’s success in becoming the economic hub of South Africa, it has failed to resolve 
the economic disparities in ways that Cape Town has. The GJMC may wish to consider the Cape 
Town experience and adopt strategies that directly deliver services to its most impoverished 
residents. 
The study of the legacy of inequity in post-Apartheid South Africa is warranted as it 
permits academics of urban studies to offer suggestions to further reduce inequities. Formally, all 
citizens in South Africa have been granted equal representation in politics. The political reforms 
introduced in the early 1990s guaranteed a democratic, non-racial state in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, the ‘Political Opportunity Structure’ theory suggests that certain groups may still 
lack access to political opportunities in cities that claim to have a democratic system of 
government. For instance, for over two decades the GJMC promised to provide the Diepsloot 
township, the largest informal settlement in Johannesburg, with adequate housing, electricity, 
waste management systems, and schools. However, the local government failed to fulfill their 
promises. Furthermore, the local leadership has not been effectively relaying the residents’ 
grievances to the local government. Consequently, the residents began to mobilize and violent 
protests broke out throughout the region.  
In order to ensure that all groups have an equal chance to access the government, 
municipal governments should introduce organizations whose primary focus is to relay the 
grievances of economically and socially marginalized groups to local government. These 
organizations would certainly help to reinforce equal political rights and representation for all 
citizens at the local level. 
In order to improve economic disparities, South African cities focus on the decentralization of 
economic activity. In essence, South African cities should shift economic gravity away from the 
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urban centers towards the urban periphery. City councils should motivate businesses and 
corporations to migrate activity to the urban peripheries through subsidies and grants. As a 
consequence, more income, wealth and job opportunities would travel to these areas, thereby 
redistributing wealth and prosperity. Furthermore, city councils could offer subsidized housing to 
reintegrate the poor and wealthy groups and merge whites and non-whites. Doing so would 
further balance citizens’ access to employment opportunities and thus improve inequities 
throughout South Africa. Finally, the South African national government could attempt to 
resolve economic inequities in its cities by calling upon the help of global organizations such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank. The purpose of these organizations has 
been to foster and promote economic cooperation, growth and financial stability around the 
world as well as combating poverty.71 Thus, the national government could ask for aid from 
these international organizations to fund economic and developmental initiatives in urban 
centres. 
The Apartheid legacy of inequity and the lack of fairness in political and economic aspects 
of life represented a major challenge for South African cities in the post-Apartheid period. This 
examination has discussed how Johannesburg and Cape Town undertook comparable political 
modifications yet contrasting economic development reforms. The political reforms implemented 
in South African cities clearly resolved political inequities and created a non-racial democratic 
state. However, cities such as Johannesburg and Cape Town, which adopted two distinct 
economic development reforms, experienced very different economic outcomes.    
These conclusions generate new questions and implications for future post-Apartheid 
studies. For example, have South African citizens become fully represented in politics in relation 
                                                
71 International Monetary Fund, "About the IMF," http://www.imf.org/external/about.htm (accessed 
November 9, 2010). 
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to the theory of the ‘Political Opportunity Structure’, and has the private sector benefitted from 
economic development initiatives in these cities? Post-Apartheid South Africa has clearly 
demonstrated its ability to resolve the key legacy of political and economic inequities. As long as 
South African municipal governments continue to redistribute equity through current strategies 
and by adopting new ones, such as those outlined above, South Africa will continue to be a 
democratic, non-racial country that promotes similar opportunities for all of its citizens in every 
area of life. 
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WEST AFRICAN WOMEN UNITE: THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN PEACE 
PROCESSES 
 
Katelyn Jones 
 
 
 
This paper focuses on the necessary involvement of women within peace-building processes. It 
asserts that a comprehensive and inclusive approach to peace and security is needed between 
men and women for successful post-conflict resolution to take place in divided societies. The 
paper begins with a discussion of the absence and exclusion of women in traditional peace 
processes. By exploring the role that women’s peace activism had upon conflicts in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Guinea, the paper then examines how the work of particular women’s groups 
have stopped armed violence and attained post-conflict transformations. Illustrating the 
achievements of the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) and the Mano River Union 
Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET), the paper examines why women are integral to 
peace-building processes and prescribes particular methods to enable and empower women as 
advocates for peace. 
 
Peacemaking is a necessary force as long as violent conflicts continue to rage between peoples 
and states. Peace-building has become a ‘buzzword’ in international policy discourse as a way to 
characterize post-Cold War approaches to global security.1 Although the concept of peace-
building has spread widely in international rhetoric, the way it is defined, interpreted and 
executed is different from place to place. What is agreed upon, however, is the fact that peace-
building must address the underlying causes of violent conflicts in order to either prevent the 
initiation of conflict or prevent its reoccurrence.2 To build successful peace in a divided society, 
a comprehensive and inclusive approach to peace and security is needed across nationalities, 
ethnicities, cultures, and particularly between men and women. 3  This paper will focus 
                                                
1 Linda Etchart and Rawwida Baksh, “Applying a Gender Lens to Armed Conflict, Violence and Conflict 
Transformation,” in Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace, ed. 
Rawwida Bakah et al. (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 30. 
2 Ibid. 
3  Susan McKay and Dyan Mazurana, “Gendering Peacebuilding,” in Peace, Conflict, and Violence: 
Peace Psychology for the 21st Century, ed. Daniel J. Christie, Richard V. Wagner, and Deborah Du Nahn 
Winter (New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 2001), 342. 
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specifically on this latter concept, the need to establish equality in the roles of men and women in 
peace-building. 
It has increasingly been recognized that men and women do not experience conflict in the 
same way.4 Each has differing needs during the conflict and is afflicted by the violence and 
unrest in different ways. Thus, men and women require different treatment in the aftermath of 
conflict. Regardless of this fact, women have traditionally been and are continually excluded 
from peace processes. In this paper, I will argue that female participation in conflict resolution is 
essential to the successful restoration of peace. The stereotype that women are generally more 
inclined to collaboration, consensus and compromise than men is in fact supported by social 
science research. As these are vital features to the peace process, it is essential that women are 
considered, empowered and enabled to play a leading role in the peace process. There is urgent 
need for the inclusion of women in peace-building processes in conflict-ridden areas, in order to 
consolidate their role as effective advocates for peace. 
It is clear that an integrated approach to preventing conflicts and rebuilding war-torn 
societies is the only way to achieve success. This process must be inclusive, accountable and 
ensure the equal participation of women and men.5 Such an approach has been successful in 
nations spanning from Papua New Guinea to Rwanda.6 My case study, however, will be based 
on the experiences of women in the West African nations of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea.  
Throughout this paper, I will illustrate the necessary involvement of women within the 
peace-building process. To do this, I will first consider the reasons for the absence and exclusion 
of women in peace processes. Next, by exploring the role that women’s peace activism played in 
                                                
4 Victor Pungong and Elsie Onubogu, “Gender and Conflict Transformation in the Commonwealth,” in 
Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Rawwida Bakah et 
al. (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 8. 
5 Pungong and Onubogu, “Gender and Conflict Transformation in the Commonwealth,” 12. 
6 Ibid. 
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conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea, I will describe how the work of particular 
women’s groups have stopped armed violence and attained post-conflict transformations. I will 
concentrate on the achievements of the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) and the 
Mano River Union Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET). Following this, I will explain 
why women are integral to the peacemaking process. Finally, I will prescribe methods to enable 
and empower women in peace processes.  
The absence of women in international meetings of conflict resolution is well 
documented.7 The traditional discourse on war and peace has either ignored women or regarded 
them solely as victims.8 This lack of inclusion has been caused by a variety of factors. While 
young men have tended to fill the roles of ‘protectors’ by engaging in combat, women and girls 
have traditionally acted as ‘providers’ of household needs while violence rages elsewhere.9 Such 
gender-based differences require different and specific responses.  
Elsie Onubogu and Linda Etchart suggest seven reasons for the absence of women in the 
peace process, all of which are supported by women’s experiences in diverse locations and 
contexts. Firstly, they suggest that because few women have wielded guns, the allocation of 
power in peace agreements has been limited to those who have been fighting for it.10 In peace 
processes, most attention is given to the demands of those who committed the violence and far 
less to citizens affected by the conflict (whom could offer alternative perspectives for peace-
building).11 As men have been the dominant instigators and perpetuators of violent conflict, they 
have also been the sole planners of post-conflict reconstruction. However, some assert that 
                                                
7 Elsie Onubogu and Linda Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” in 
Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Rawwida Bakah et 
al. (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 34. 
8 Onubogu and Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” 34. 
9 Pungong and Onubogu, “Gender and Conflict Transformation in the Commonwealth,” 8. 
10 Ibid., 39. 
11 Ibid., 34. 
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“Allowing men who plan wars to plan peace is a bad habit.”12 For the task of re-establishing 
peace to fall to the same individuals who initiated and perpetuated the conflict seems 
counterintuitive. Not surprisingly, this method has begun to be reinterpreted due to its 
ineffectiveness.  
Secondly, Onubogu and Etchart suggest that there is an assumption which claims that what 
men from a community want is what women want also;13 this presupposes that men represent the 
interests of the community as a whole, including the women. As stated earlier, men and women 
experience conflict in very different ways; therefore, when men determine how reconstruction 
should occur, the needs of women are undermined. This issue ties into their next argument: 
women have been excluded from public life because of tradition, customs or culture. 14 
Participation in public life is essential for inclusion in processes of post-conflict reconstruction. 
Considering the fact that women are largely absent from national power structures, such as 
government, diplomatic or military relations, they are scarcely considered to be participants of 
the negotiating parties in peace talks.15 
Additionally, the absence of women in peace processes is explained on account of 
logistical and security issues. 16  Because post-conflict reconstruction meetings and peace 
negotiations are often held in distant locations, security concerns arise for many women. In areas 
where sexual and gender-based violence has occurred, some may fear coming into contact with 
the very group or individual who abused them. Limited finances, lack of transportation or family 
commitments are other such issues that may prevent women from attending.  
                                                
12 Swanee Hunt and Cristina Posa, "Women Waging Peace," Foreign Policy 124 (2001): 38. 
13 Onubogu and Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” 34. 
14 Ibid., 39. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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In light of these reasons, the involvement of women in the peace process has been and 
could further be effortlessly set aside. The complications that accompany the involvement of 
women are certainly complex; some would even deem this unworkable. However, women can 
also be the “most powerful voices for moderation in times of conflict.”17 While most men arrive 
at the first round peace talks straight from the battlefield, women most often come out of civil 
activism or family care.18 Therefore, Onubogu and Etchart conclude that those “responsible for 
the organisation of peace talks should ensure that women leaders and peace-builders are 
identified, that visible and effective security arrangements for women are put in place and that 
provision is made for their needs.”19 If these few but essential accommodations were made, the 
invaluable participation of women in the peace process would invariably increase. 
More recently, there has been greater international recognition of the need for gender 
mainstreaming* in all levels of the peace process.20 Such recognition is in part due to the UN’s 
Second World Conference on Women in 1985, the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, as well as the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which puts women’s rights at the forefront of determining their 
needs in post-conflict areas.21 Such steps have proven vital to the recognition of women’s 
necessary involvement in conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. 
African Women’s Groups Lead the Way in Peace Processes 
                                                
17 Hunt and Posa, "Women Waging Peace," 38. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Onubogu and Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” 39. 
* According to the UNDP, gender mainstreaming serves to ensure gender equality and empowerment in 
mainstream policies and resource allocations. In practice, gender mainstreaming means identifying gaps 
in gender equality. A more extensive definition can be found at 
http://www.undp.org/women/mainstream/.  
20 Onubogu and Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” 34. 
21 Ibid. 
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Though women have been largely absent from official peace processes and peace-building 
initiatives, 22  African women’s groups have “continued to use their numerical strength, 
sisterhood, and shared experiences to bring about change.”23 Unfortunately, since the mid-1980s, 
these needed changes have been largely ignored by the spread of armed conflict that emerged in 
regions of West Africa. Most notably was the fourteen years of war that plagued Liberia, and 
crossed the borders into Sierra Leone and Guinea. 24  These associated conflicts caused 
tremendous suffering throughout each of the regions. Under these circumstances, development of 
gender equality and empowerment came to a halt.25  
The Mano River Basin comprises mass regions of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. At 
various times in the twenty-first century, these areas have been regarded as the most violent in 
the world.26 According to the UNDP 2003 study, all three nations were classified as Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs).27  
The Mano River Union (MRU) was first established in October of 1973 between Liberia 
and Sierra Leone, with Guinea later joining in 1980.28 This union was designed to allow free 
movement of peoples and products through the regions in the hope of fostering economic 
                                                
22 Thelma Ekiyor and Leymah Gbowee, “Women's Peace Activism in West Africa: The WIPNET 
Experience,” in People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society, ed. Paul van Tongeren et al. 
(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 134. 
23 Ibid., 133. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Christiana Solomon, “The Mano River Union Sub-region: The Role of Women in Building Peace,” in 
Gender Mainstreaming in Conflict Transformation: Building Sustainable Peace, ed. Rawwida Bakah et 
al. (The Commonwealth Secretariat, 2005), 171. 
27 Ibid., 172. 
28 Ibid. 
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cooperation and social integration.29 Later, in 1986, a Non-Aggression Treaty was also signed 
between the three regions to again enhance the union.30 
Despite these efforts, neither economic cooperation nor social integration between the 
regions could stop the outbreak of armed conflict. A series of violent chain reactions occurred in 
Liberia after an invasion by dissident forces from nearby Cote d’Ivoire in 1989.31 This conflict 
caused a mass ‘spill over’ effect in Sierra Leone in 1991, then cross-border warfare into Guinea 
in 2000.32 The collective conflicts have been characterized by “unparalleled human rights 
violations, blatant disregard for international norms and law pertaining to the conduct of war, and 
heinous war crimes.”33 
These conflicts have been extremely complex due to the shifting of military and political 
alliances which has occurred between the three governments. Consequently, the conflicts have 
been “intertwined and have shown a ready potential to spill over and destabilise neighbouring 
countries.”34 Explanations for the initial outbreak of the wars have been debated. Though some 
scholars suppose it was principally related to ethnic or resource-based disparity, other 
suggestions have been made. For example, Christiana Solomon sees that the “conflicts were 
rooted in the nature and type of state formation, the nature of domestic politics and increasing 
economic, social and political polarisation.”35 She further suggests that the simulated “rhetoric of 
social justice and greater equity developed by the warring factions” appealed to recruits enough 
                                                
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid., 173. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
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to “mobilise them to stage an armed social protest.”36 It was these protests that soon erupted into 
armed conflict across three national borders. 
The years of bloody war that raged throughout Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea have left 
the MRU severely fractured. The original goals of economic cooperation and social integration 
have been forgotten in the wake of mass violence against civilians in all three nations. The 
consequences of the wars are seen in the large-scale suffering, unnumbered deaths, forced 
migration of hundreds of thousands of people and gender-based violence.37 Peace and stability in 
the region seemed an impossible task. However, starting in 2001, women again began to play a 
central role in shaping processes of disarmament, negotiation and conflict resolution. Two 
women’s groups instrumental in these actions were the Women in Peacebuilding Network 
(WIPNET) and the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MARWOPNET). 
WIPNET was initially an alliance formed between Christian and Muslim women. Their 
foremost goal was to use ‘women’s peace activism’ to promote social justice.38 Ekiyor and 
Gbowee (two women directly involved in WIPNET’s movement) explain women’s peace 
activism not just as antiwar activism, but as “the deconstruction of structural forms of violence 
existing in everyday society.”39 The particular ideology that this action was built on is as follows: 
“that systematic violence against women such as rape, forced prostitution, mutilation, etc., was 
an expression of a deeper systematic disregard for women existing in West African societies.”40 
                                                
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ekiyor and Gbowee, “Women's Peace Activism in West Africa: The WIPNET Experience,” 134. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
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Led by this ideology, these women were convinced that it was possible to ensure that women 
play a central role in peace processes and decision-making in the Mano River region.41 
Following its creation in 2001, WIPNET enacted substantial change on behalf of women in 
the MRU region, particularly in Liberia. In this time, the movement: 
developed a training manual on peacebuilding; helped organize training workshops, 
conferences, and other meetings; conducted research; published stories on women’s 
peacebuilding activities; engaged in peacebuilding and democracy-building activities in 
Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Gambia, and Mali; and undertook a range of other 
activities to build regional peace and mobilize women.42 
 
Thus, it is evident that their achievements for women in the region were vast and wide-ranging in 
scope. 
Also, among WIPNET’s greatest achievements was their campaign to force the Liberian 
President, Charles Taylor, and the rebel warlords of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy (LURD) to attend peace talks in June of 2003. These talks were carried out to 
convince the warring factions to reach an agreement and to end the war and suffering in Liberia. 
The campaign slogan they chose was simple: “We Want Peace; No More War.”43 The success of 
this single movement brought extraordinary change. They were able to pressure President Taylor 
into meeting with them, and at this meeting they “spelled out a clear program calling for an 
immediate unconditional cease-fire, dialogue for a negotiated settlement, and an intervention 
force.”44 WIPNET maintained their presence nearby the peace conference to ensure their 
demands were met and on 17 June 2003, a cease-fire agreement was signed.45  
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., 135. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 136. 
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Also significant was the international media attention that WIPNET gained during this 
campaign. As a result, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for 
President Taylor and labelled him a war criminal. It was not until 11 August 2003 that Taylor 
agreed to resign, enabling a comprehensive peace agreement to finally be reached.46 The 
rebuilding of Liberia continues with the inclusion and participation of women at every stage.47 
This mass movement for peace undertaken by the women of WIPNET exemplifies how women 
can contribute significantly both during the peace-building process and in post-conflict social 
reconstruction. 
MARWOPNET is an alliance that also partners women in Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Guinea. It is a network that finds common cause “despite tensions, cultural divides and different 
nationalities,” and aims to promote peace by connecting women from the Mano River regions. 48 
Their central purpose is to emphasize the importance of the inclusion of women in the peace 
process and to pursue a common agenda for peace and sustainable development.49 The network 
comprises thirty umbrella organizations which work to promote the same goals.50 In a short 
amount of time, MARWOPNET’s network base spread to include other national, regional and 
international organizations.51 
The breakthrough that MARWOPNET achieved in the political decision-making process 
was parallel to the events that WIPNET was involved in. With civil wars raging in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone and Guinea, the women of MARWOPNET began a campaign in 2001 to persuade leaders 
                                                
46 Ibid., 137. 
47 Ibid., 133. 
48 Solomon, “The Mano River Union Sub-region: The Role of Women in Building Peace,” 177. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Femmes Africa Solidarité, “Engendering the Peace Processes in West Africa: The Mano River 
Women's Peace Network,” in People Building Peace: Successful Stories of Civil Society, ed. Paul van 
Tongeren et al. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 588. 
51 Ibid. 
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to engage in talks.52 This campaign proved successful as they persuaded President Taylor of 
Liberia, President Lansana Conte of Guinea and President Tejan Kabba of Sierra Leone to come 
together for peace talks.53 This was the first time that these three Heads of State would meet to 
discuss peacekeeping along their borders and the problems that spilled over from one country 
into the next.54 Just as the women of WIPNET were to pressure President Taylor and LURD to 
peace talks two years later, these women held peace talks between MARWOPNET delegations 
and the presidents in June and August of 2001.55 The network’s success in collaborating with 
leaders of the MRU enabled women to “secure access to decision making structures – especially 
in regard to peace and development processes.”56 
In addition, MARWOPNET made many other significant achievements. Some of which 
included programs to return and reintegrate refugees and internally displaced people to their 
homes, the destruction of small arms held by rebel groups, the rehabilitation of child soldiers and 
the increased cooperation of Mano River states.57 Notably, MARWOPNET’s capacity building 
continued to expand by hosting workshops that focused on equipping women to take part in 
peace-building.58 The contributions of both WIPNET and MARWOPNET demonstrate that the 
inclusion of women in the peace-building process is invaluable to conflict resolution and 
sustainable development in conflicted and post-conflict societies.  
                                                
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 589. 
54 Solomon, “The Mano River Union Sub-region: The Role of Women in Building Peace,” 177. 
55 Femmes Africa Solidarité, “Engendering the Peace Processes in West Africa: The Mano River 
Women's Peace Network,” 589. 
56 Ibid., 590. 
57 Ibid., 591. 
58 Ibid. 
75
Chartrand: Complicating Obligations Arising from Past Injustice
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010
  11 
Consideration, Enablement and Empowerment of Women in Peace Processes 
The face of global security threats has changed significantly in the post-Cold war period. Armed 
conflicts have decreased on the battlefield and increased in communities bringing the 
consequences of conflict into peoples’ homes.59 As a result, women and children are much more 
likely to be the casualties of war. Whereas only 50 per cent of casualties were civilians in the 
Second World War, the figure is close to 90 per cent in more recent wars.60 On account of this 
change, it is imperative that women are empowered in peace processes so immediate action can 
be taken to prevent further gender-based violence and to dispel of the notion that women are 
helpless in times of conflict. 
Scholars have suggested that a feminist analysis identifies women’s specific concerns 
about “peacebuilding, approaches peacebuilding from women's perspectives, [and] welcomes 
pluralistic voices and diverse methods.”61 Each of these is important to peacemaking and peace-
building processes, therefore it is essential that women are considered, enabled and empowered 
to participate in the peace process. Although groups such as WIPNET and MARWOPNET have 
achieved great success in their struggle for women’s inclusion, if further considerations were 
made and methods for inclusion were implemented, a larger collection of women could have 
further advanced the work of advocating for peace. 
Returning to Onubogu and Etchart, they suggest three reasons for why women should be 
included in peace processes. Firstly, they explore the fact that human rights standards of equality 
and fairness require women’s participation in public life, yet there have been few attempts to 
                                                
59 Etchart and Baksh, “Applying a Gender Lens to Armed Conflict, Violence and Conflict 
Transformation,” 22. 
60 Ibid. 
61 McKay and Mazurana, “Gendering Peacebuilding,” 342. 
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apply their participation to peace processes.62 Most states have adopted the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, but failure to include women in 
affairs of the state (such as policy and decision-making) has legitimized their exclusion from any 
aspect of post-conflict reconstruction.63 Next, they state that because conflict is highly gendered, 
women’s varied experiences are central to their determination of post-conflict needs.64 They 
explain that an effective peace process should be “built on the widest base of experience and 
therefore must take account of local women’s lived experiences during the conflict and their 
enormous responsibilities post-conflict.”65 Lastly, the importance for women to progress from 
being perceived solely as victims to agents of conflict is illustrated.66 This move would promote 
transformation and empowerment of women. Women have already developed and operated 
networks, movements and initiatives in conflict zones, their further involvement in post-conflict 
peace-building is essential for its success. 
In order to provide a comprehensive prescription of methods of promoting women’s 
inclusion in the peace process, specifics of how this ought to be fostered must be suggested. The 
implementation of the UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security would be a powerful tool 
for all women’s rights activists.67 This motion calls for women’s involvement in peace talks and 
in decision-making groups who formulate peace agreements. This would create opportunities for 
gender equality in post-conflict reconstruction. Nevertheless, this opportunity has been lost in 
numerous instances of nation-building in the twentieth century.68 It has been suggested that in 
                                                
62 Onubogu and Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” 40. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 41. 
66 Ibid., 42. 
67 Femmes Africa Solidarité, “Engendering the Peace Processes in West Africa: The Mano River 
Women's Peace Network,” 592. 
68 Onubogu and Etchart, “Achieving Gender Equality and Equity in Peace Processes,” 38. 
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order for this tool to be used effectively, African women must “advocate for its implementation 
at the national level”, then the “international community must support them, both politically and 
financially.” 69  Such committed international support in this endeavour could increase the 
implementation of these ideas in conflicted areas of the world. 
Gender balance and mainstreaming is also essential to increasing the involvement of 
women in peace-building. Access to education is essential to attaining either of these. Etchart 
and Baksh explain that “Sustainable peace is only attainable if all citizens, women and men, 
regardless of class or ethnicity, are able to vote in all elections and public referenda and be 
eligible for election in public posts.”70 Without advanced education (let alone primary school) 
women are not even eligible for such roles. When interviewed about this issue, one African 
woman said this: "The basic need of women is education … I think education will help 
everything else." 71  Funds and effort must be directed towards increasing and enhancing 
educational systems as well as ensuring access to education worldwide, in order to ensure greater 
opportunity for the inclusion of women in public processes such as peace-building initiatives. 
A crucial element of an effective conflict transformation process, and especially 
characteristic of the approaches of female advocates for peace, is a creative-conflict approach. 
This enables parties involved in violent conflict to be “respected, to be enabled to speak out, to 
be listened to and to become involved in decision-making.”72 As women’s “full participation is 
                                                
69 Femmes Africa Solidarité, “Engendering the Peace Processes in West Africa: The Mano River 
Women's Peace Network,” 592. 
70 Etchart and Baksh, “Applying a Gender Lens to Armed Conflict, Violence and Conflict 
Transformation,” 32. 
71 Perdita Huston, Third World Women Speak Out: Interviews in Six Countries on Change, Development, 
and Basic Needs (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), 110. 
72 Etchart and Baksh, “Applying a Gender Lens to Armed Conflict, Violence and Conflict 
Transformation,” 28. 
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stressed in all these processes … it is frequently personal, interpersonal, creative and political.”73 
This may include imaginative activities to protest against violence such as the use of street 
theatre, vigils, patterned or coloured clothing, or peace walks. The women of WIPNET, for 
example, employed creative approaches to peace advocacy such as wearing white clothing and 
supporting a campaign of “No peace, no sex.”  
In view of each of the above considerations, it is evident that there is urgent need for the 
empowerment of women as advocates for peace. There must be progress beyond the rhetoric of 
“peace-building” in international conflict resolution. One of the most pivotal areas of this 
progress is to establish an inclusive, accountable and equal vision of the roles of women and men 
in peace-building.  
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AN IMPERFECT BODY? 
AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE SPECIAL COURT OF SIERRA LEONE 
 
Danielle Koehn 
 
It is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 people died during the Sierra Leone civil war. 
30,000 people had a limb removed by the rebel forces and up to 257,000 acts of sexual violence 
occurred. The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up to bring those most responsible for the 
conflict to justice. This paper will assess the effectiveness and legacy of the court and seeks to 
show that while the Special Court is not perfect, the positives far outweigh the negatives.  
 
 “I want to prosecute the people who forced thousands of children to commit unspeakable acts.” 
– Special Court of Sierra Leone Prosecutor David Crane1 
 
Introduction 
For a decade Sierra Leone was caught up in a horrific civil war that featured mass atrocities. In 
order to try and heal the wounds caused, achieve justice for the victims and come to terms with 
what had happened, both the Special Court of Sierra Leone and a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission were set up through UN Security Council Resolution 13152 at the request of 
President Kabbah.3 This paper will focus on the Special Court of Sierra Leone and assess 
whether it will have a positive or negative legacy. Due to the limitations of this paper and the 
breadth of this topic, this paper will give only a brief overview of the conflict, the creation of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the relationship 
between the two bodies. In the second part of this paper the Special Court will be analyzed by 
considering the arguments for and against the court and its work. This paper seeks to show that 
while the Special Court is not perfect, the positives far outweigh the negatives. This paper will 
                                                
1 Augustine S. J. Park, “Community-based restorative transnational justice in Sierra Leone,” 
Contemporary Justice Review 13, no.1 (2010): 99. 
2 William A. Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 36.  
3 William A. Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” in Truth Commissions and Courts: The Tension 
Between Criminal Justice and the Search for Truth, ed. William A. Schabas and Shane Darcy 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004): 16   
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hold that the Special Court for Sierra Leone has brought much needed justice to the atrocities 
committed against the Sierra Leonean people. 
Overview 
The Conflict 
Sierra Leone is a former British colony located on the west coast of Africa. The conflict began 
on March 23, 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) first invaded Sierra Leone from 
Liberia.4 Throughout the war, the RUF and the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) 
rebel groups fought against the government (Sierra Leonean Army) and a government-backed 
militia group, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).5 During the conflict horrific crimes were 
committed, including the use of child soldiers and forced marriages of girls and women to 
combatants.6 By 1999 the rebel groups had descended upon Freetown, the capital, prompting the 
government to request peace.7 It is estimated that between 20,000 to 50,000 people died during 
the conflict, 30,000 people had a limb removed by the rebels and up to 257,000 acts of sexual 
violence were committed during the civil war.8      
On July 7, 1999, the Lomé Peace Agreement was created through negotiations between the 
RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone to end the war.9 The Togolese Government, Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Commonwealth, the Organization of 
                                                
4 Ibid., 21. 
5 Joseph F. Kamara, “Preserving the Legacy of the Special Court for Sierra Leone: Challenges and 
Lessons learned in Prosecuting Grave Crimes in Sierra Leone,” Leiden Journal of International Law 22 
(2009): 763. 
6 Valerie Oosterveld, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced Marriage: 
Providing Clarity or Confusion?” Canadian Yearbook of International Law 45 (2007): 133.  
7 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, 
34. 
8 Ploughshares, Armed Conflict Report: Sierra Leone (1991-first combat deaths), September 2002, 
http://www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/ACRText/ACR-SierraLeone.html#Deaths. 
9 Zoe Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” in Rescuing a Fragile 
State: Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier 
University, 2009): 29.  
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African Unity (now the African Union), and the UN signed on to the deal as “moral 
guarantors.”10 Within the deal there was agreement for an immediate ceasefire, a general 
amnesty for combatants who committed crimes between the start of the conflict and the date of 
the agreement, and the creation of a national Human Rights Commission and a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.11 A qualification was added at the last minute to disassociate the 
UN from the pardon and amnesty given to combatants to prepare for the establishment of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone.12 The treaty proved to be more of a ceasefire than a transition 
plan for stability in Sierra Leone.13 The plan was that the agreement would address human rights 
violations since the beginning of the conflict in 1991.14 However, there was an outbreak of 
fighting in Sierra Leone for a few weeks in May 2000 that was quickly dealt with by the 
government, which arrested many RUF supporters. Subsequently, a reassessment was made of 
the amnesty that was granted in the Peace Agreement, resulting in the removal of some signers’ 
amnesty.15 
The Creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone’s President Kabbah wrote to the Security Council on August 9, 2000, requesting the 
establishment of an international tribunal to prosecute members of the RUF and its accomplices 
who were responsible for committing the crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and UN 
                                                
10 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, 34. 
11 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29. 
12 Peter Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” in Rescuing a Fragile State: 
Sierra Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier University, 
2009): 55.  
13 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 15. 
14 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 55. 
15 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, 35. 
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peacekeepers. 16  Kabbah’s letter stated that the RUF had “since reneged on [the Lomé] 
Agreement.” 17  On August 14, 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1315 18 
requesting that the Secretary General “negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra 
Leone to create an independent special court.”19 A UN delegation led by Ralph Zacklin 
(Assistant Secretary General for Legal Affairs) went to Freetown to negotiate terms for the 
establishment of a court that would try those who bore the greatest responsibility for the war 
crimes and crimes against humanity during the Sierra Leone Civil War.20 The Special Court was 
not confined to prosecuting only those of Sierra Leonean nationality; however, as per the Rome 
Statute, prosecution of foreign nationals was limited to circumstances in which the accused’s 
national state was “unwilling or unable genuinely” to prosecute.21 Due to criticisms over how 
other international courts had been set up outside of the country whose conflict it was 
investigating, it was agreed that the Court’s hearings should take place in Freetown, where some 
of the worst atrocities took place. The Court was set up to incorporate a combination of 
international and Sierra Leonean law.22 While the Special Court is similar to a hybrid tribunal 
                                                
16 Ibid. 
17 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 16. 
18 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, 36. 
19 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 56. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 22. 
22 That being said, while Sierra Leone allows capital punishment, the maximum punishment the Special 
Court allows is life in prison, which favours international law. On the other hand, international law was 
not adhered to in regards to not trying children, as the Special Court will try those 15 and over (it has not 
tried any children yet). Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 56.  
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(which brings an international component to essentially national prosecutions),23 it is in fact 
more of an ad hoc tribunal because it is a creature of international law, not domestic law.24 
The final agreement to establish the Special Court of Sierra Leone was signed on January 
16, 2002, by the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations.25 The Parliament of Sierra 
Leone ratified the agreement in March 2002 when the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone was passed, providing the legal framework of the Court.26 Under the terms of the Statute 
the Court would cover crimes “committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 
1996,”27 the date of the Abidjan Peace Accord.28 In order to be able to prosecute those who 
should be held accountable, the Statute repudiated amnesties from the Lomé Peace Agreement 
(and the Abidjan Peace Accord that had previously been signed) which involved crimes against 
humanity, violated Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Additional Protocol II, or committed 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law (crimes from Articles 2 to 4 of the 
statute).29 However, the Statute excluded “any transgressions by peacekeepers and related 
personnel.”30  
There are three main bodies that make up the Special Court: the Chambers, made up of a 
Trial Chambers and an Appeals Chambers; the Office of the Prosecutor; and the Registry.31 On 
                                                
23 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and 
Sierra Leone, 5. 
24 Ibid., 6. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 Ibid., 39. 
27 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 59. 
28 Ibid., 60. 
29 United Nations, “Report of the Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,” UN Doc S/2000/915, October 4, 2000, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/PDF/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement.  
For the statute in its entirety, see Sierra Leone Government, “Statute of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone,” January 16, 2002, http://www.sc-l.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3D&.  
30 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
31 Ibid., 57.  
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July 26, 2002, the Special Court32 appointed Pierre Boutet (Canada), Benjamin Ite (Cameroon), 
and Bankole Thompson (Sierra Leone) as trial judges. Emmanuel Ayoola (Nigeria), Hassan 
Jalloh (The Gambia), Renate Winter (Austria), Geoffrey Robertson (UK), and George Gelaga 
King (Sierra Leone) were appointed as appeal judges.33 Alternative judgeships were appointed to 
Isaac Abagye (Ghana) and Elizabeth Muyovwe (Zambia).34 The Special Court judges were 
sworn into office in December 2002.35 Robin Vincent (UK) was appointed to act as the Registrar 
due to her experience.36 David Crane was made prosecutor due to his previous work in human 
rights law and the inability to find an individual from Africa with the necessary experience 
(which would have been preferred). Originally the statute setting up the Special Court stated that 
the Deputy Prosecutor was to be Sierra Leonean; however, this was amended to allow for 
Desmond de Silva (British QC), who had been previously admitted to the Bar in Sierra Leone.37 
Beginning on March 7, 2003, and continuing for the next month, indictments were 
announced for: Foday Sankoh (leader of the RUF), Sam Bockarie (RUF henchman “Mosquito”), 
Issa Sesay (senior RUF Commander), Morris Kallon (senior RUF Commander), Augustine 
Gfbao (senior RUF Commander),38 Johnny Paul Koroma (AFRC Chairman), Alexa Tamba 
Brima (AFRC member), Brima Bazzy Kamara (AFRC member), Santigie Borbor Kanu (AFRC 
member), Chief Sam Hinga Norman (CDF member), Moinana Fofana (CDF member), and Alieu 
Kondeqa (CDF member).39 Many of the most important indictees and actors, however, had died 
                                                
32 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 20. 
33 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 57. 
34 Ibid., 58. 
35 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, 39. 
36 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 58. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 60. 
39 Ibid., 61. 
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or were unaccounted for.40 For example, by the time the Court was ready to begin trials in July of 
2002,41 Sankoh, Bockarie and Koroma had passed away and Johnny Paul Koroma was missing.42 
This was naturally a very frustrating situation for those involved in the Court, as these men 
were believed to bear the greatest responsibilities for the atrocities in Sierra Leone’s war. This 
had such a large impact that some even called for the Court to be disbanded. 43 There were 
concerns over the length of the proceedings, so in March 2004 the Special Court re-issued joint 
indictments for the CDF, RUF and AFRC trials. Many witnesses were called throughout the 
trials, a number of whom gave evidence anonymously behind screens.44 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
One cannot discuss justice in Sierra Leone without looking at the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission as well. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), formally established 
July 5, 2002,45 had an ambitious mandate “to ‘create an impartial historical record of violations 
and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in 
Serra Leone’; to address impunity in the country; to address the causes of the conflict with a 
view to prevent reoccurrence; to address the needs of victims (especially those of children and 
those who had been sexually abused); and, to promote reconciliation.”46 The Commission was 
headed by Bishop Joseph Humper47 as Chairman and Sierra Leonean lawyer, Yasmin Jusu-
Sherriff as Executive Secretary. Overall, the TRC was comprised of a mix of local and 
                                                
40 Ozonnia Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” in Rescuing a Fragile State: Sierra 
Leone 2002-2008, ed. Lansana Gberie (Waterloo: LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier University, 2009): 
50. 
41 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 19. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 64. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 43.  
46 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29.  
47 Ibid., 30. 
87
Chartrand: Complicating Obligations Arising from Past Injustice
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2010
  7 
international commissioners.48 The TRC was given independent status, some financial support 
for investigations and was granted subpoena powers.49  
At first, it was thought that people would not want to talk about abuses suffered or admit to 
crimes. However, once the TRC began its work it was clear that there was a great need for 
people to be heard, have their stories recorded and have their perpetrators known.50 Originally, 
the presence of the Special Court deterred many perpetrators from coming forward as they were 
afraid that the evidence would be used at the Special Court against them or their former 
commanders.51 As it became evident that only those at the top of command would be prosecuted 
under the Special Court, more perpetrators came to the TRC.52  
The TRC gathered information, had public and camera hearings (for children, victims of 
sexual abuse and certain perpetrators), and allowed perpetrators to respond to victim allegations 
when possible. However, this was rare as the accused were difficult to locate due to relocations 
and fear of retaliation.53 Special arrangements were made for the children’s hearings to protect 
their identities and ensure their well-being with psychological workers present.54 
Although the government created the TRC it has failed to give much attention to its 
activities, final report and recommendations.55 Many people utilized the TRC, and the popular 
experiences and airing of grievances created expectations for the future. Yet, not much has been 
done by the government with these recommendations.56 While there may have been some 
                                                
48 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
49 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 29. 
50 Ibid., 30.  
51 Ibid.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Ibid., 31.  
54 Ibid., 32. 
55 Ibid., 29. 
56 Ibid., 30.   
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mistaken identities because of the flexibility of the TRC, information was gathered that would 
not normally come to light because of the creativity and protection of the TRC.57  
The TRC found that “those in leadership in government, public life and civil society failed 
the people of Sierra Leone.”58 The TRC also found that many were eager to blame the causes of 
the war on foreign elements and the search for diamonds as it took away blame for political 
failure from the elites of Sierra Leone.59 However, the Commission ruled that: 
“the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived 
the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty. The Commission 
[held] the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period 
responsible for creating the conditions for conflict.”60 
 
Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, the TRC held that many of the causes of the conflict still 
exist in post-war Sierra Leone, and are potential causes of future conflict if not addressed soon.61 
In terms of accounting for the atrocities that took place, the TRC found that 60.5% of the 
violations reported to the Commission were committed by the RUF, 9.8% by the AFRC, 6.8% by 
the SLA, 6% by the CDF, and 1.5% by the ECOMOG force. 62  The TRC foresaw the 
reconciliation of Sierra Leone occurring in stages. First was the establishment of the Lomé Peace 
Agreement, creating a viable environment for reconciliation. Second was the moment when 
communities began to create activities in which trust could be restored. Truth telling was an 
important stage of this process as were reparations, which served as a symbolic 
acknowledgement of the wrongs suffered. The third phase would occur when Sierra Leonean 
                                                
57 Ibid., 32.  
58 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, “Chapter 2- Findings,” in Witness to Truth- 
Volume 2, (2004): 32. Accessible online at http://www.sierra-leone.org/TRCDocuments.html.  
59 Dugal, “‘Witness to Truth’: The TRC for Sierra-Leone – An Overview,” 33. 
60 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone, “Chapter 2- Findings,” 27. 
61 Ibid., 107.  
62 Ibid., 27.  
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citizens would forgive one another for the atrocities committed during the war, a process which 
may take decades.63 
The Relationship between the TRC and Special Court 
While both the TRC and the Special Court attempted to investigate and understand the complex 
Sierra Leonean conflict, they did so from different perspectives. Both explained to the people of 
Sierra Leone that the bodies were not working as a single unit, but valued each other’s work 
towards post-conflict justice.64 In terms of how the TRC and Special Court interacted, there was 
confusion and disagreement about each body’s role.65 It was initially recommended by some that 
the two bodies share resources. However, once operational it wasn’t clear how this would be 
feasible given their distinct mandates and important independent tasks. 66  While both 
organizations utilized public education campaigns67 throughout the country to promote their 
functions, the TRC received more widespread support.68 The only significant dispute between 
the two bodies was over testimony by indicted prisoners.69 
Geoffrey Robertson, the first president of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court, 
argues that the tribunal had a special role to play in achieving reconciliation, stating: 
“Within the fallible parameter of human justice, with its fundamentals of due process, 
transparency and defence of rights, we are charted to do our best to end the impunity 
that powerful perpetrators would otherwise enjoy. This much is owed to the memory of 
murdered victims, to maimed survivors and to those who grieve for them. It is a duty we 
share with another body, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up by the Sierra 
                                                
63 Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 51. 
64Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 5. 
65 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
66 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 29. 
67 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 62. 
68 Ibid., 63. 
69 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 5.  
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Leone government. We shall work together to uncover the truth, although the Court 
alone has the power to deliver the justice that is a prerequisite for reconciliation.”70 
 
Analysis 
 
Criticism of the Court 
 
 Creation of the Court 
 
As previously mentioned, under the terms of the Statute, the Court would cover crimes 
from November 30, 1996, onwards71 (date of the Abidjan Peace Accord).72 Utilizing this date, 
however, led many Sierra Leoneans to believe that the Court only cared about the people living 
in Freetown and the Western Area, as much of the impact of the war was not felt for these people 
until after November 1996. This further entrenched the divide between the capital and the rest of 
Sierra Leone, which dates back to the colonial era.73 Article 8 of this Statute enabled the Special 
Court to have primacy over the Sierra Leone national courts, which had a significant impact 
when Defence Counsel appearing before the Court said the Special Court was unconstitutional, 
since the Sierra Leone constitution states that no court can have higher judicial authority than the 
Sierra Leone Supreme Court. 74   
 Foreign Staff 
There have been a number of criticisms regarding the court appointments, namely that all 
“senior staff at the Special Court were expatriates.”75 This has been viewed as an indication of a 
lack of respect and recognition of qualified Sierra Leoneans. Some felt that “[t]he Special Court 
                                                
70 Ojielo, “Beyond TRC: Governance in Sierra Leone,” 50.  
71 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 59. 
72 Ibid., 60. 
73 Ibid.   
74 Ibid., 56. 
75 David Keen, Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone (Oxford: James Currey, 2005): 319. 
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does not trust Sierra Leone to administer justice. If they are not trusted to administer justice, how 
can they be expected to accept it?”76  
Further, Prosecutor Crane brought in many ex-military personnel as investigators, which 
gave the Office of the Prosecutor an American military feel.77  Crane also made controversial 
statements, such as that those indicted “would never see a free day again.” These statements 
were made before their trials even occurred.78 
 Finances of the Court 
When the Court initially began the Office of the Prosecution spent ten times more than the 
Office of the Defence and employed three times more staff. 79 The Special Court was also 
criticised for the particularly expensive cost of the Court itself, as it has spent 150 million 
dollars.80 This money comes from over thirty countries with the US, UK, Netherlands, and 
Scandinavian countries as top donors.81 However, for the second poorest country in the world 
(according to the UNDP ranking), with people dying of malnutrition, preventable medical 
diseases and the aftermath of war, it would be quite difficult to see so much money being poured 
into this Special Court when the most horrible of people are being treated better than the 
country’s citizens.82 On average the indictments have so far cost 23 million dollars each.83   
 Length of the Operation 
There have been criticisms regarding the length of time the Special Court has been in 
operation, as it was only meant to last for three years and is still running today. The initial three 
                                                
76 Ibid. 
77 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 58. 
78 Ibid., 61. 
79 Ibid., 68. 
80 Ibid., 67. 
81 Ibid., 68. 
82 For example, those imprisoned by the Special Court get 3 meals and 2 snacks a day, while victims of 
the perpetrators likely have far less. Ibid., 67. 
83 Ibid., 68. 
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year plan was unrealistic in part because of the time it took to set up the Court.84 While the plan 
was to have the Special Court complete all trials and appeals by 2010, it has not done so; an 
expert panel has predicted that the Tribunal will be “unable to fulfil its mission before 2016.”85  
 Legal Ramifications 
Some saw criminal prosecution, and thereby the Special Court, as a threat to peace and 
security “and a Western intrusion in African accountability mechanisms.”86 As previously 
mentioned, three of the perpetrators who were considered the “worst” were unable to be tried, 
which was a great disappointment and almost cause for dismantling the Special Court.87  
Many also saw the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the more appropriate 
institution to bring peace and healing to the community.  This was supported by pointing to the 
fact that the TRC was met with more widespread support by Sierra Leoneans themselves.88 “The 
Special Court promotes reconciliation through punishment, while the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission does not punish anyone, but promotes healing.”89 Or, as the TRC put it “[a] 
criminal justice body will have largely punitive and retributive aims, whereas a truth and 
reconciliation body will have largely restorative and healing objectives.”90 In addition, the TRC 
also had a direct impact on, and contact with, people’s day-to-day lives. Finally, it did not help 
                                                
84 Ibid. 
85 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
Leone, 41. 
86 Schabas, “A Synergistic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 26. 
87 Penfold, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone: A Critical Analysis,” 64. 
88 Ibid., 63. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, “Chapter 1- Executive Summary,” in Witness to Truth- Volume 
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the Special Court that the TRC was critical of how the Special Court allowed exceptions to the 
amnesty some thought they would be granted when signing peace treaties.91 
Arguments for the Court 
 Creation of the Court 
Fortunately for the integrity of the Special Court, the defence claims that the Special Court 
was unconstitutional were rejected.92 Also, the choice by the Court to try crimes from after 
November 1996 was not meant to be a political statement or to value the security of the capital 
over rural Sierra Leone; rather, it was a strategic decision intended to target crimes committed 
after the Abidjan Peace Accord.93 
 Foreign Staff 
With an international court, regardless of the location of the country it is hosted in, it is 
inevitable that the court staff will be mostly foreign to that country. When dealing with issues 
such as human rights and international criminal law it is best to employ the leaders in the field, 
rather than take on local citizens for the sake of placating the host country. Further, the situation 
in Sierra Leone was such that the prolonged conflict inevitably killed and drove away many of 
the people who would be most qualified to participate in the Court. It is important to note that 
Sierra Leoneans were not excluded from the makeup of the Court, as Bankole Thompson was 
appointed as a trial judge and George Gelaga King was made an appeal judge.94 Although the 
prosecutor ended up being American it was clear that the original intent was to have this role 
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filled by an African.95 The deputy prosecutor was Desmond de Silva (British QC) who had been 
previously admitted to the Bar in Sierra Leone.96  
 Local Impact 
 Because the Special Court was held within the country that experienced the atrocities of 
the perpetrators, the community could feel more included in the justice process than in previous 
ad hoc tribunals. The Court made outreach very important in its operations with even Prosecutor 
Crane travelling to rural communities of Sierra Leone that are not easily accessible.97 The 
outreach by the Court was so extensive that there was a person designed for outreach in each of 
the provinces. Every Tuesday and Wednesday school children would be educated about the 
history of the conflict and the work that the Court was doing. The Court would reach out to the 
general population in a variety of means including setting up booths at local markets.98 NGOs 
such as No Peace Without Justice became involved in community outreach to facilitate public 
information and sensitisation on the Special Court. The outreach program worked through other 
local organizations to formulate the issues in a way that was easily understandable for the 
general public, fostering the role of civil society in promoting accountability within Sierra 
Leone.99 By having the local population able to understand and get updates on the trials, the 
Special Court could bring justice to those who needed it most: the victims. Because of this 
outreach, the citizens of Sierra Leone understand that those most responsible for the atrocities 
must be brought to justice so that the society can heal and look to the future. The outreach done 
                                                
95 Ibid., 58. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Park, “Community-based restorative transnational justice in Sierra Leone,” 99. 
98 Anna Matas, “The International Criminal Court,” A lecture presented to the Canadian Center for 
International Justice’s Continuing Legal Education on Criminal and Civil Liability for Crimes Against 
Humanity, Genocide and Torture, March 5, 2011. 
99 No Peace Without Justice, “Preface: An overview of No Peace Without Justice activities in Sierra 
Leone,” in No Peace Without Justice- Sierra Leone Conflict Mapping, 
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by the Court and NGOs is the single most effective way of reaching the Court’s underlying goals 
of encouraging peace and justice in this fragile post conflict region. 
 Finances 
While initially there was uneven funding between the offices of the prosecutor and 
defence, it has since evened out.100 A possible explanation for this is that the prosecutor’s office 
needed the finances initially to begin investigations before the indictments could be announced. 
Once it was made public who would be charged it was then time for the defence office to use its 
resources to defend the accused; to do so before hand would have been impossible.  While the 
expense of the Court overall may seem substantial, it is significantly cheaper than others such as 
the Rwanda Tribunal, which costs 120 million dollars per year101 or 10 % of the UN’s overall 
budget for the ICTY and ICTR combined.102 Further, the infrastructure that the Court has set up 
will be able to be utilized by Sierra Leone once the Court has completed its work. 
 Length of the Operation 
When it was necessary to build a new facility, hire staff, investigate allegations, and allow 
time for defence, initial trials and appeals, it should be of little surprise that the Special Court is 
running longer then intended. It is better to have more thorough trials when the issues at hand are 
of such national and international importance rather than rushing through them for the sake of 
staying on schedule. The Court is currently in the midst of the complex case of Charles Taylor at 
The Hague; however, on the whole the Court is in the process of wrapping up its operations, as 
evidenced by the handing over of security responsibilities from UN Peacekeepers to the Sierra 
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101 Ibid., 67. 
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Leone Police. This step is significant as “the Special Court is set to become the first international 
tribunal to complete its mandate and transition to a Residual Mechanism.”103 
 Legal Ramifications 
Looking at the Special Court from a legal perspective, the Court has left, and will continue 
to leave, a positive and significant legacy on the development of law both nationally and 
internationally.  
On the national level, Antonio Cassese, UN commissioned independent expert, reported 
that the Court’s legacy includes “(a) use of the Special Court’s infrastructures; (b) trials by Sierra 
Leonean courts of international crimes committed by middle-level alleged perpetrators; (c) 
impact on the Sierra Leone legal professional and (d) training and redeployment of Sierra 
Leonean personnel that have worked for the Court.”104 By empowering and involving Sierra 
Leoneans in the international and local justice systems, the Court has brought real justice to the 
people the people of Sierra Leone. The legacy of bringing to justice those most responsible for 
atrocities, building up the nation’s justice system, and empowering the local citizens will help to 
prevent future atrocities.  At a meeting of the UN Security Council in June 2007, the President of 
the Council (and agreeing speakers) described the Special Court as contributing to 
“strengthening stability in Sierra Leone and the sub-region and [to] bringing an end to 
impunity.”105 Furthermore, the indictments and arrest of Charles Taylor illustrated that even the 
most powerful leaders can be subject to international law.106  
                                                
103 Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach and Public Affairs Office, “UN Hands Over Special Court 
Security to Sierra Leone Police,” February 17, 2011, 
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105 Security Council, “UNSC Statement by the President of the Security Council,” S/PRST/2007/23, June 
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On an international level, the Special Court has helped to create a “highly developed and 
sophisticated body of law, in which the definitions and scope of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide have been explored, along with the various forms of participation and 
liability, the available excuses, justifications and defences, procedural matters, issues concerning 
the rights of the accused and the relevant considerations in determining appropriate penalties.”107 
Notably, the Special Court was the first to try cases about the war crime of forced marriage,108 
conscription, enlistment or use of child soldiers on an international level109 with the AFRC and 
CDF trial judgements.110 The RUF sentencing judgement (in April 2009) was “the first ever 
[conviction] within an international or internationalized criminal tribunal for the war crime of 
attacking personnel involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission, and for the 
crimes against humanity of sexual slavery and forced marriage (as an inhumane act).”111 
Additionally, international criminal tribunals such as the Special Court provide a great deal of 
guidance to the International Criminal Court.112  
These significant additions to international criminal law are important not only on an 
international level, but on the domestic as well; there is evidence that international tribunal law is 
influencing national courts’ case law.113 By building on international law and creating precedents 
in emerging areas of law, such as child soldiers, the Court achieved significance not only for the 
                                                
107 Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra 
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108 Oosterveld, “The Special Court for Sierra Leone, Child Soldiers, and Forced Marriage: Providing 
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110 Ibid., 137. 
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people of Sierra Leone, whose worst criminals had to be brought to justice in order for the 
society to be able to move on, but also for an international community that requires guidance in 
trying future perpetrators of these crimes. Most importantly, the Special Court of Sierra Leone 
provided a mechanism for the carrying out of international legal obligations that were required 
by the “prosecution and punishment of perpetrators of serious violations of human rights.”114 No 
one is above the law, and the international community has contributed to the furthering of this 
principle by creating the Court. This illustrated to Sierra Leoneans and the world that what 
happened in Sierra Leone was recognized as unacceptable and that assistance is always available 
to help rid the world of impunity.  
Conclusion  
It is undeniable that, in a perfect world, the Court would cost less and every person possible 
would be held accountable for their actions. Indeed, it is easy to criticize and find flaws, 
especially when there are such great expectations. However, the case of the Special Court of 
Sierra Leone demonstrates that it is important to be realistic and carefully weigh the positive and 
negative consequences. What is most important about the Court is its overall positive legacy, not 
just for international law (although clearly it is immense) but for the people themselves whom 
the Court was able to reach.  It is because the positives far outweigh the negatives that ad-hoc 
tribunals, international courts, and truth and reconciliation commissions must continue to exist 
and be used as mechanisms to engender justice in post-conflict societies.  
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ENGAGING THE TAMIL DIASPORA IN PEACE-BUILDING EFFORTS  
IN SRI LANKA 
  Michael Potters 
 
 
 
Refugees who have fled the conflict in Sri Lanka have formed large diaspora 
communities across the globe, forming one of the largest in Toronto, Canada. Members 
of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have infiltrated these communities and 
elicited funding from its members, through both coercion and consent, to continue the 
fight in their home country. This paper outlines the importance of including these 
diaspora communities in peace-building efforts, and proposes a three-tier solution to 
enable these contributions.  
 
On the morning of October 17, 2009, Canadian authorities seized the vessel Ocean Lady 
off the coast of British Columbia, Canada. The ship had entered Canadian waters with 76 
Tamil refugees on board, fleeing persecution and violence in the aftermath of Sri Lanka’s 
long and violent civil war. This was the first group of refugees to arrive in Canada by 
boat in more than 20 years, but more importantly, it was the first large group of people to 
arrive in Canada since the end of the war in Sri Lanka in May 2009.435  
Since the beginning of the war in 1983, Canada has accepted thousands of Tamil 
refugees from Sri Lanka. From a population of fewer than 2,000 Tamils in 1983, 
Canada’s Tamil population has grown to between 110,000 to 200,000 persons,436 90 
percent of whom live in Toronto.437 The arrival of the Ocean Lady was significant. It not 
only brought attention to the humanitarian crisis in Sri Lanka, but also to the significance 
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of Canada’s Tamil diaspora – the largest in the world – and their role in the affairs of 
their homeland.438  
The purpose of this paper is to examine the role and significance of the 
transnational Tamil diaspora in relation to the ongoing conflict in Sri Lanka, with 
emphasis on the Canadian diaspora, particularly in Toronto, and support of the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). First, it will examine the role of the Tamil diaspora in the 
perpetuation or prevention of conflict in Sri Lanka. This section will begin with an 
explanation of the history of the civil war in Sri Lanka.  Second, it will explain the 
continually evolving role of the diaspora in relation to the conflict. The paper will 
conclude with a three-tier prescription for diaspora involvement in peace-building efforts. 
In order to understand the role of the transnational diaspora network in the civil 
conflict of Sri Lanka, it is important to understand its history. Sri Lanka is an island state 
in the Indian Ocean, south of India. Its population is divided into four ethno-religious 
groups. The Sinhalese majority compromise approximately 74 percent of the population 
and control the government. They are primarily Theravada Buddhist, speak the Sinhala 
language, and populate the southern and central parts of the country.439  Sri Lankan 
Tamils make up 11 percent of the population. They are mostly Hindus, and most of them 
settled in the northern part of the island around the city Jaffna. The two other groups are 
the ‘up-country’ Tamils, as well as the Sri Lankan Moors.440 The conflict, however, is 
largely between the Sinhalese Majority, and the Sri Lankan Tamil minority.  
Since Sri Lanka gained independence in 1948, the Tamils have demanded more 
power and better representation in government in order to protect their interests and 
                                                
438 Ibid., 418. 
439 Ibid., 412. 
440 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
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autonomy from the Sinhalese majority. The Tamil demand for representational power in 
government, however, was not accommodated. 441  Eventually, disillusioned by 
conventional politics, many Tamils began to argue for the creation of a separate Tamil 
state called Eelam. A secessionist agenda was born as an ethnic consciousness and sense 
of nationalism developed within the Tamil population. In 1975, The LTTE became the 
guerilla organization at the forefront of the secessionist struggle, harnessing the 
frustrations of the Tamil minority and becoming the ‘sole spokesman’ of the Tamil quest 
for sovereign statehood.442 As frustrations mounted, violence escalated, and Tamil youth 
in particular began to participate in the insurgency movement.443  A civil war erupted in 
the northeastern part of the country in 1983, between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government, and continued until the official military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009.  
Since 1983, the conflict between the Tamil separatists and Sinhalese government 
forces in Sri Lanka has claimed over 65,000 lives and displaced over a million persons.444 
The tragic loss of life cannot be understated. According to scholars however, the 
displacement and upheaval of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population, both internally and through 
migration abroad, is one of the most significant consequences of the war.445 Formed by 
several migration waves since independence in 1948, the Tamil diaspora is estimated at 
one million as of 2010, or approximately one quarter of the entire Sri Lankan Tamil 
                                                
441 For further discussion and a brief history on the issue of political accommodation for the Tamil 
minority, see the section in Wayland entitled “Overview of Ethnicity and Conflict in Sri Lanka” 
(pg. 411-415). 
442 Sumantra Bose, States, Nations, Sovereignty: Sri Lanka, India, and the Tamil Eelam 
Movement (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994), 87. 
443 For further discussion on the importance of radicalization of Tamil youth, see Bose, pg. 114. 
444 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 414. 
445 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
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population.446 Tamils abroad, despite their diversity – including date of arrival, length of 
stay, and legal status in their host countries, gender, caste, region, socio-economic 
standing and political orientation – usually continue see themselves as belonging to the 
diaspora.447  
Sarah Wayland, research associate at the Centre for Excellence on Immigration and 
Settlement - Toronto, defines the modern diaspora in her piece, “Ethnonational Networks 
and Transnational Opportunities: The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora.” She states, “A 
diaspora is a type of transnational community that has been dispersed from its homeland, 
whose members permanently reside in one or more ‘host countries,’ and possess a 
collective, sometimes idealized, myth of the homeland and will to return.”448 Gabriel 
Sheffer, Professor of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, adds more 
to this definition by describing fundamental characteristics of the modern diaspora: 
They maintain their ethno-national identities, which are strongly and directly 
derived from their homelands and related to them ... display communal 
solidarity, which gives rise to social cohesion ... They are engaged in a variety of 
cultural, social, political and economic exchanges with their homelands, which 
might be states or territories within states ... often create trans-state networks 
that permit and encourage exchanges of significant resources, such as money, 
manpower, political support, and cultural influence, with their homelands as 
well as with other parts of the same diaspora. 449 
 
Further, Wayland focuses on and describes the Tamil diaspora in particular. She 
states,   
Diasporas such as the Tamil one exist largely because of ethno-nationalist 
conflict and persecution in the homeland. The Tamil diaspora in particular is 
comprised of refugees and exiles who are forced to leave their home country 
                                                
446 Ibid. 
447 Ibid. 
448 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 408. 
449 Gabriel Sheffer, "Ethno-National Diasporas and Security," Survival 36, no. 1 (1994): 60. 
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because of conflict rather than because of economic need or the wish to forge a 
new life abroad. 450 
 
Once accepted into liberal democratic host countries with refugee status, it 
becomes possible for the diaspora to express Tamil linguistic, cultural, and religious 
identity as never before. Tamils who migrate from a closed society to one that is open 
capitalize on the country’s freedoms to publish, organize, and accumulate financial 
resources to an extent that was not possible in their homeland.451 This collective sense of 
empowerment in combination with a shared vision of an independent state of Eelam in 
their home country provides an opportunity structure whereby social, political, and 
financial support is mobilized. In the case of the Sri Lankan Tamils, this was 
consolidated in the LTTE. 
The LTTE claims to represent the political interests of the Tamils. Before its 
defeat, it consistently propagated a three-fold message through its political and 
diplomatic activities in an effort to condemn the Sri Lankan government and strengthen 
political support for the insurgency, both within the diaspora and outside of it.452 
Christine Fair, assistant professor at the Centre for Peace and Security Studies at 
Georgetown University, explains this three-fold message propagated by the LTTE,  
That Tamils in Sri Lanka are innocent victims of military repression by Sri 
Lanka’s security forces and of Sinhalese anti-Tamil discrimination; That the 
LTTE is the only legitimate voice of the Tamils and is the only vehicle capable 
of defending and promoting Tamil interests in Sri Lanka; There can be no peace 
until Tamil’s achieve their own independent state under the LTTE’s 
leadership.453 
 
                                                
450 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418. 
451 Ibid., 417. 
452 Christine C. Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and 
Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no. 1 (2005): 143, accessed 
March 25, 2010, doi:10.1080/13537110590927845. 
453 Ibid. 
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It would appear from this message that the Tamil community is united under the 
banner of the LTTE. However, this may not be the case. The diaspora community is 
divided in this respect. Not every diaspora Tamil donates funds to the LTTE or supports 
them politically, and countless Tamils have fallen victim to LTTE violence. 454 
Throughout the 1980s, the LTTE waged war and conducted a campaign of assassinations 
and bombings against rival militants and moderate Tamils in an effort to silence dissent 
and consolidate support in Sri Lanka.455 This intolerance and violence forced many 
Tamils to seek refuge abroad. As a result of their exile, some Tamils feel a sense of 
victimization and injustice by the LTTE and do not support them.456 Others support the 
LTTE to satisfy feelings of guilt for leaving their homeland behind.457 In this sense, it is 
very difficult to determine the true level of diaspora support for the LTTE insurgency.  
The fact remains, however, that the diaspora community plays a major role in the 
conflict through varying degrees of support for the LTTE. As Fair explains, “The 
diaspora has been a fundamental component of the Tamil insurgency and the backbone 
of the LTTE’s global operations.”458 Since 1980, the LTTE has established a global 
network of offices and cells that spans at least 40 countries and is unrivaled by any other 
insurgent organization. 459  This network, or what Fair describes as a “global 
                                                
454 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
455 Ibid. 
456 Ibid. 
457 For further readings on the importance of guilt in Tamil support for the LTTE, see Chapter D 
“Creating One Voice”, in the issue brief titled “The Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTTE,” 
by the International Crisis Group.  
458 Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 139. 
459 Ibid., 140. 
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infrastructure,” is based to a great extent on the support and participation of the 
diaspora.460  
Wayland describes three fundamental activities Tamil elites used to mobilize 
diaspora activity, ultimately impacting the conflict in Sri Lanka.  These activities were: 
“information exchange within the Tamil community via Tamil language newspapers, 
radio, the Internet and ethnic organizations; spreading awareness of the Tamil struggle 
through marches, conferences, and the lobbying of government officials; and lawful as 
well as illegal fundraising. 461  All three types of activities, namely Intra-Tamil 
communication, outreach from the community and political lobbying and fundraising, 
reinforce a proud, independent Tamil identity.462 The impact of these activities played a 
crucial role in the civil war in Sri Lanka and may continue to play a role in the future. 
Tamil diaspora networks and communications are a rich and fundamental element 
of Tamil identity formation and group cohesion. This is evident in the rise of the Tamil 
society in Toronto over the past two decades.463 In 2004, there were ten weekly Tamil 
language newspapers, four Tamil language radio stations broadcast seven days a week, 
three cinemas showing Tamil language films, and many other outlets of Tamil expression 
and information exchange in Toronto.464 
The internet has also provided a very important means of communication among 
Tamils. Tamil websites provide access to news about Sri Lanka, often analyzing current 
events with a Tamil perspective and providing an up-to-date chronology of the conflict in 
the homeland. The internet has also been extensively used to establish cyber 
                                                
460 Ibid. 
461 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 418 
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communities, chat rooms and user groups.465  These networks and forms of technological 
communication are crucial to reinforcing the Tamil ethnonational identity and affiliation 
with their homeland. Moreover, they are used by elements of the LTTE to consolidate 
support for their efforts.466 Through these networks, the LTTE, or supporters of the 
LTTE, distribute propaganda and manage the perception of the conflict in the homeland, 
further legitimizing their image as protectors of the interests of Tamils.467 
Tamil identity networks are reinforced by political mobilization in the form of 
conferences, marches, and various types of advocacy or lobbying.468 This is a major 
activity of the diaspora in the host countries.469 The increasing number of refugees and 
their transition from refugee claimants to citizens or permanent residents has empowered 
and enabled the diaspora to become influential players in the politics of their host 
countries, capable of bringing attention to the Tamil issue and impacting policy.  
Before being labeled a terrorist organization in 2001 by the United Nations, the 
LTTE lobbied host governments through umbrella organizations, openly espousing its 
secessionist agenda and ‘three-fold message.’470 In Canada, lobbying was primarily 
conducted by the Federation of Association of Canadian Tamils (FACT), an LTTE 
umbrella organization of ten Tamil associations with a pro-secessionist stance.471 Since 
2001, political participation has evolved. Supporters of the LTTE in the diaspora now 
focus on working within the system by getting Tamils elected to office and using 
                                                
465 Fair, "Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 139. 
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electoral clout and money to influence policy makers.472 Even those pro-LTTE diaspora 
initiatives carrying forward the struggle for an independent state in democratic and 
transparent ways remain committed to the LTTE’s agenda.473  
The LTTE have been very effective at mobilizing the massive Sri Lankan Tamil 
diaspora. This mobilization is described by Fair as the “economic backbone of the 
militant campaign,” and is carried out through both coerced and consensual 
contributions.474 Sometimes this money is given willingly out of belief that the efforts of 
the LTTE are the only way to achieve autonomy and security for the Sri Lankan Tamils. 
In other cases, ‘donations’ are collected like a tax by force, by the threat of force, or 
through the exploitation of individuals who may be in a given country illegally and are 
seeking protection or assistance from the LTTE.475 This ‘tax’ system is used to ensure a 
regular flow of income to the LTTE. In Canada, the minimum tax was roughly $30 per 
person or family per month depending on the individual’s income,476 and other sources 
allege that Tamil businesses abroad are forced to pay Tigers a portion of their earnings.477 
Significant funds also come from individual contributions through community temples, 
cultural and political events, as well as other activities held in support of the Tamil 
population.478  
                                                
472 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
473 Ibid., 23.  
474 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies," 140. 
475 Ibid., 141. 
476 International Crisis Group, “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE.” 
477 Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 141.  
*This is described by Fair as “proxy lending” by the LTTE. The LTTE puts up an initial 
investment in Tamil-run small businesses abroad. The profits made are then split between the 
LTTE and the owner. Fair claims that if the figures still remain valid from the mid 1990’s, this 
proxy lending in Canada generates roughly $1 million per month.  
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It is important to note that Tamils in Canada are not alone in supporting the LTTE 
from abroad. Yet, the Canadian connection is very significant. As a police spokesman in 
the largest city and commercial capital of Sri Lanka, Colombo, stated, “Canada has been 
a hotbed of the Tigers. That is where the biggest contributions come from.”479 In Toronto, 
in particular, police claim that LTTE supporters sent as much as $1 million Canadian a 
month to finance the war in Sri Lanka.480 
The Sri Lankan government estimates that the LTTE’s overseas fundraising 
reached $80 million per year.481  During the conflict, funds raised from abroad were used 
for destruction and reconstruction alike. Initially, most of the money was used for 
sustaining Tamil societies in war affected areas. However, as the war continued, 
increasing amounts shifted away from humanitarian aid towards sustaining the 
insurgency.482 Despite the military defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, pro-LTTE elements 
of the diaspora continue to raise funds in order to carry forward the struggle.483  
The defeat of the LTTE in Sri Lanka has left much of the diaspora in a state of 
shock and denial, and has caused a reevaluation of the role that the diaspora plays in the 
affairs of the homeland.  There is a general acceptance amongst some Tamils across the 
globe and political spectrum that the LTTE is a spent military force with little chance of 
                                                
479 Wayland, “Ethnonationalist Networks and Transnational Opportunities,” 422. 
480 Ibid., 421 
481 Ibid., 421.  
*This figure is disputed by Tamil leaders, claiming it is much less than $80 million. Tamil leaders 
claim it is impossible for such a newly formed diaspora to raise such a large sum, a sum that 
would require average annual contributions of more than $100 from every Tamil individual living 
overseas. 
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returning.484 Most of the pro-LTTE elements of the diaspora have acknowledged, albeit 
reluctantly, that militancy has failed and the struggle for an independent Tamil state 
should proceed non-violently. However, the more hardline elements of the diaspora 
would still prefer the LTTE to be fighting for Tamil Eelam, choosing militancy over 
peaceful politics and ignoring its failure.485 Some leaders who have been considered 
radical in their politics have been frustrated by what they perceive as a lack of attention 
being paid to the Tamil situation. These leaders choose unconventional and sometimes 
illegal means to convey their message.486  
It is clear that as the diaspora struggles with new political realities, and as new 
strategies emerge, so too will divergent opinions on a way forward. Yossi Shain, 
professor of comparative government and diaspora politics at Georgetown University, 
explains this in his article entitled “The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation and 
Resolution.”  He states, “When the conflict is hot and the homeland is under severe 
threat, diaspora concerns about the homeland’s existential survival are paramount, and 
divergent opinions may be subsumed under a broader show of support. But when the 
possibility of peace arises, homeland-diaspora debates and power struggles emerge.”487 
                                                
484 Ibid. 
485 Ibid. 
486 Ibid. 
487 Yossi Shain, "The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution," SAIS Review 22, 
no. 2 (July 2002): 135, accessed March 25, 2010, 
http://resolver.scholarsportal.info/resolve/10883142/v22i0002/115_trodicpor. 
*Divergent opinions exist within the diaspora community, but also exist between the diaspora and 
the Tamil community that remains in Sri Lanka - between homeland and diaspora. There is 
considerable difference in the opinions of these two groups, although they may share a common 
goal. However, for the purpose of this essay, the difference in opinion between these two groups 
will not be discussed in detail. For more information on these differences, see the section 
“Divergent Opinions,” in “The Sri Lankan Diaspora after the LTTE” by the International Crisis 
Group.   
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In the case of Sri Lanka, the possibility of peace has arrived. These internal struggles 
should be carefully negotiated in order to prevent a return to the violent LTTE agenda.  
In the field of conflict resolution, the current stage of this particular conflict might 
be referred to as the conflict de-escalation and negotiation stage. This stage is crucial for 
the creation and maintenance of peace. As this article has explained, the diaspora have 
played a critical role in the conflict through the support of the LTTE insurgency. With the 
defeat of the LTTE, there is room to reconstruct a peaceful agreement between the Tamil 
community and the Sri Lankan government, with the support of the well-established 
Tamil diaspora. In order to avoid a reemergence of conflict, all elements of the diaspora 
community must be considered as important factors in the negotiation process.  
I suggest a three-tier prescription for engaging the Tamil diaspora in peace-building 
efforts in Sri Lanka. The first tier of this prescription focuses on the role of host 
governments. Host governments should acknowledge the significance of diaspora 
communities in relation to homeland conflict and engage them. Governments have the 
necessary task and responsibility of ensuring public safety and security, as well as 
promoting peace abroad.  Therefore, it is important that host governments better 
understand the nature of all diaspora within their borders, and their connection to conflict 
in their homelands. Governments, including the Canadian government, should 
acknowledge the possibilities and benefits of engagement of diaspora communities and 
incorporate them in policy-making decisions.  
The second tier focuses on the relationship between the host government and the 
diaspora community. This relationship should be built by encouraging the diaspora 
community to commit to peaceful engagement with the Sri Lankan government. 
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Governments may be reluctant to engage with a non-state group that engages in, or 
supports, the use of violence. For many host governments, however, a simple rejection of 
violence by diaspora groups, although a major first step in working towards peace, is 
insufficient for them to completely support diaspora efforts. In order for the host 
government to commit to the diaspora, diaspora leaders would not only have to reject 
violence, but also reconsider the separatist and illiberal policies of the LTTE, as well as 
recognize the damage that the LTTE has done to communities in Sri Lanka and to the 
Tamil struggle in general. Consensus within the diaspora in this regard is a goal to work 
towards. This major shift in strategy can be facilitated with the help of the host 
governments.  
The third tier will, in effect, determine the attractiveness of the second tier. It 
focuses on the host government and the international community. By encouraging 
consensus on the need for non-violence within the diaspora, the host government and the 
international community can increase pressure on the Sri Lankan government to address 
Tamil grievances. This could take the form of a reconciliation process or institutional 
reforms at the state and local level. Most importantly, reforms should be made in Sri 
Lanka which empower and support minority political forces and promote a more 
democratic Tamil community. The Sri Lankan government will also need to address the 
longstanding sense of marginalization, disrespect, and insecurity amongst the Tamil 
minority which essentially gave rise to the LTTE.  
This paper has explained the significance of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora in 
relation to the conflict in Sri Lanka through support of the LTTE insurgency. It has 
described, in turn, three very important activities which diaspora leaders use to 
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consolidate support for the LTTE, namely intra-Tamil communication, political lobbying 
and outreach from the community, and fundraising. Through varying degrees of support 
and participation in these activities, the diaspora sustained the LTTE and thus played a 
role in the perpetuation of conflict in Sri Lanka.  This paper has argued that diaspora 
communities also have the potential to play a significant role in peace-building and 
conflict resolution processes in their homeland.  
The defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 has created an opening whereby efforts can 
be undertaken to utilize the well-established Tamil diaspora for post-conflict peace-
building. This article provides a three-tier prescription as one possible way forward. First, 
host governments should acknowledge the significance of diaspora communities in 
relation to homeland conflict and seek to engage them. Second, this relationship can be 
built by encouraging the diaspora community to reconsider the violent LTTE separatist 
agenda and strive for peaceful solutions. Third, in order for the latter to be successful, 
legitimate Tamil grievances must be addressed by the Sri Lankan government through 
pressure from the international community.  
After decades of civil war in Sri Lanka, the opportunity for peace-building has 
arrived. As responsible citizens of Canada, a country which hosts the largest Tamil 
diaspora in the world, there is an obligation to move forward proactively, engage with the 
generally respected government, and find a suitable, sustainable, and peaceful solution to 
the Sri Lankan conflict and Tamil struggle. Members of the Tamil diaspora are members 
of Canada’s immediate community, but are also intimately connected to another 
community in another part of the world. Thus, Canada plays a unique role in post-conflict 
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reconstruction in Sri Lanka, a role that Canada should embrace carefully, but without 
hesitation.   
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